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EXPLORING THE KOZINSKI PARADOX: WHY IS MORE
EFFICIENT REGULATION A TAKING OF
PROPERTY?*
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL**
I. THE PARADOX OF EFFICIENCY IN HALL V
CITY OF SANTA BARBARA
Alex Kozinski is a Federal Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. He is among the Reagan judicial appointees who have been in-
fluenced by the law and economics movement. Unlike some others in the
law and economics tradition, Kozinski retains a libertarian outlook on
many issues. He has defended flag mutilation as a form of free speech
both on the bench' and at gatherings of conservatives. At one of the
latter, he dramatized his position by unfolding a flag he had obtained
during a trip to his native Rumania. The Rumanian flag was defaced, its
hammer-and-sickle center ripped out in protest during the revolution
against the Communist Ceuscescu regime. 2
My text for this article is Judge Kozinski's 1986 opinion in Hall v.
City of Santa Barbara.3 Hall held that a mobile home rent-control regu-
lation could be a taking of property and hence require just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment, seemingly contrary to a long line of prece-
dents that have upheld rent control. The paradox to which the title of
this article alludes appears in footnote 24 of the opinion.4
Citing economists of a variety of political persuasions (e.g., conserv-
atives Alchian and Allen and liberals Nordhaus and Samuelson), Judge
* Revision of a draft presented at the Conference on Law and Economics of Local
Government, University of Virginia Law School, Nov. 8-9, 1991, sponsored by the John M. Olin
Foundation. The article was written while I was an Olin Fellow in Law and Economics at the Law
School of the University of California at Berkeley. I wish to thank both the Foundation and the Law
School for their support. My leave was supported in part by a Rockefeller Grant from Dartmouth
College. Helpful comments on earlier drafts were received from Vicki Been, Richard Epstein, Daniel
Farber, Saul Levmore, Edgar Olsen, Andrea Peterson, Daniel Rubinfeld, Joseph Sax, Stewart Sterk,
and participants in seminars at Berkeley, Stanford, the University of British Columbia, and the
University of Hawaii as well as the University of Virginia.
** Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College, Department of Economics, Hanover, NH.
1. See McCalden v. California Library Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1230 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) ("The federal courts have a long and proud tradition of protecting the right of individ-
uals with unpopular points of view to express themselves publicly even where this subjects onlookers
to intense discomfort, even anger.") (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning)).
2. Professor Daniel Rodriguez, who clerked for Judge Kozinski, told me this story.
3. 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988).
4. 833 F.2d at 1279 n.24.
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Kozinski noted that the typical rent control ordinance creates inefficient
incentives for tenants to overstay. Because tenants normally lose their
right to a below-market rent when they move, they are apt to remain in
their units longer than otherwise in order to have the advantage of low
rents. The Santa Barbara mobile home rent control ordinance at issue in
Hall cured such inefficient incentives because existing tenants could cash
out future benefits when they moved. (The indirect method of the cash-
out will be described presently.) In distinguishing Santa Barbara's ordi-
nance from conventional rent control, Judge Kozinski noted that "the
very fact of the inefficiency-that the tenant is not given too great a stake
in the property-saves most rent control schemes from potential uncon-
stitutionality. After all, efficiency would be maximized by giving the ten-
ant a fee simple interest in the property."'5
The paradox to be explored is why a judge versed in law and eco-
nomics should regard improved efficiency as a reason to strike down a
regulation as a taking. Note that this goes beyond what I believe most
critics of law and economics would say about efficiency, that it is or
should be irrelevant to judicial decisions. 6 Judge Kozinski's dictum is
used in this article to explain why inefficient regulatory transfers, as
economists normally understand that term, should not usually be re-
garded as takings of property.
Conversely, it is argued here that certain efficient regulatory trans-
fers, 7 those that respond to the wishes of the majority of voters and
5. Id.
6. This position is taken most vigorously by the Critical Legal Studies school. See, e.g.,
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387
(1981). One leading Crit, however, rationalizes normal rent control on the grounds that its inefficient
inalienability serves the desirable goal of perpetuating a low income community in the face of gen-
trification. Mark Kelman, On Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empiri-
cal" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 271 (1988); see also William H.
Simon, Social Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1359-61 (1991). Neither Kelman nor
Simon considers mobile home rent control of the type at issue in Hall, but presumably both would
oppose it, since the ability of tenants to cash out their entitlement increases the original tenants'
mobility and hence does nothing to perpetuate the original community and its communitarian val-
ues. Scholars who subscribe to the view that local politics especially advances communitarian values
should be alarmed by the evidence that, when given the opportunity, prevailing local factions are
inclined to take the money and run.
7. The term "regulatory transfer" is intended to exempt regulations that impose burdens pro-
portionately among those who receive the benefits. The classic example is the zoning regulation
imposed on people who have equal holdings of land to refrain from activities that may benefit one
but devalue the property of others. Such zoning may be efficient if it is the least costly means of
accomplishing mutually agreed upon goals. Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules, and Fines As Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 693 (1973). In many
cases, however, zoning imposes burdens on one set of owners (e.g., owners of undeveloped land) to
benefit another set of owners (e.g., owners of already-developed homes). WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, Do
GROWTH CONTROLS MATrER? 47 (1990). The type of ordinance considered in the present article is
of the latter variety, in which there is a transfer of wealth from one group to another, but in which
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which have little deadweight loss, are much stronger candidates for being
regarded as takings. My position is not that inefficiency is desirable, but
that in many contexts, inefficiency is evidence that political and economic
processes are available to protect those burdened by excessive regulation,
so that courts should not intervene on behalf of the aggrieved property
owners. This approach finds jurisprudential virtue in two of the bugbears
of economists, deadweight loss and special-interest legislation. 8
Hall's footnote 24 is not a sport on Kozinski's part. I wrote to him
about it on March 6, 1989. In his letter to me of March 20, 1989, he cited
his opinion in another case in which he "espouses the advantages of inef-
ficiency in running the government." 9 I must add that this communica-
tion, our sole intellectual contact, should in no way suggest that Judge
Kozinski agrees with what I have written here or elsewhere about the
takings issue. Nor have I seen the efficiency dictum referred to in later
opinions on rent control by Judge Kozinski. t0
A brief description of my previous work on regulatory takings may
help the reader grasp the thrust of my argument. Most of my economic
research since the early 1970s has concerned government land use regu-
lation, usually in an urban, local government context."I I came to the
conclusion that the takings clause was an attractive means of disciplining
the inefficient excesses of local government land use controls. With that
in mind, I authored or coauthored several papers on economic aspects of
the takings issue,12 and I organized (with Richard Brooks) a conference
there is at least some color of public purpose. This article will not consider the question of the
plausibility or efficiency of the public purpose.
8. I will proceed in this article on the pessimistic assumption that most state and federal regu-
lations have much deadweight loss and are the product of special interest legislation. I half believe
that, but the other half thinks that many regulations so characterized have subtle efficiency virtues
and, more importantly, that a lot of regulatory legislation is passed by politicians who want to do
good things for the general public. Among the reasons for my ambivalence is that it is empirically
difficult to distinguish the special interest model from its supposed opposite, the public interest
model. See Robert Plotnick, Redistribution to the Poor: An Overheard Conversation, 14 PUB. FIN. Q.
223 (1986). My reason for opting for what I suppose to be the pessimistic model in this article is that
the main criticism of judicial laissez-faire comes from those who subscribe to the special interest
model of politics. See, e.g., infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
9. Letter from Alex Kozinski, Judge, 9th Cir., to William A. Fischel, Professor of Economics,
Dartmouth College (Mar. 20, 1989) (on file with author).
10. See Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1991) (moving rent
control cases into federal courts because the California courts had rejected the Hall possessory inter-
est doctrine); Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding and
providing guidelines for monetary damages to mobile home park owners who had sued under the
Hall doctrine), withdrawn, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17358 (9th Cir. 1992).
11. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS (1985), discusses takings in the
zoning context in chapters 8 and 9.
12. William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance and Michelman: Comments on
Economic Interpretations of Just Compensation Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988) [hereinafter
Fischel & Shapiro, Takings]; William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model of
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of law and economics professors on the 1987 takings decisions.1 3 I also
audited classes in property, contracts, constitutional law, and state and
local government at Vermont Law School. Partly to get a first-hand look
at local regulation, I volunteered to serve on a zoning board from 1987
until 1991.
My research and experience of the last five years have impressed me
with the limitations of the judicial system as an economic policy maker. I
have argued at some length, for example, that judge-ordered school fi-
nance reform in California had the unanticipated effect of triggering a
major property tax revolt, which in turn has been detrimental to local
government in general and education in particular.1 4 My growing skepti-
cism of judicial capacity has caused me to reassess my 1985 position that
takings jurisprudence offers much hope for relief from inefficient regula-
tions. 15 This essay is the beginning of that reassessment, which I plan to
develop into a book in the next few years. (Having written one lengthy
book, I know enough not to forecast when it will be published or even to
hazard the eventual title.)
In my view, many acts by the government may qualify as takings of
property, many more than courts of law should find to violate the Consti-
tution. The point of this essay is not to describe what acts constitute
regulatory takings. Professor Richard Epstein has undertaken the task,
Compensation for Takings, 9 INT'L REV. OF L. ECON. 115 (1989) [hereinafter Fischel & Shapiro,
Constitutional Choice Model]; William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property
Rights Analysis, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101 (1987).
13. The conference papers were published as The Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1581 (1988), for which I wrote an introduction that summarizes my views, William A. Fischel,
Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581 (1988).
14. See William A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 465 (1989).
To use the fiscal debacle caused by Serrano to condemn judicial activism in support of economic
liberties may strike some readers to be as unfair as condemning the U.S. nuclear industry because of
the Chernobyl disaster. Serrano was based on an application of the equal protection clause, not the
takings or due process clause. See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). As Ralph Winter
observed, however, Serrano was unconsciously in the tradition of economic due process, and he
criticized it for that reason. Ralph Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 58, 100-01. A theory that urges judges to broadly apply the takings
clause cannot easily deny the same application of the equal protection clause.
15. My earlier discussions of takings law did express reservations about the capacity of judicial
review. See FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 169. The present article offers what I hope are more convinc-
ing reasons for this skepticism as well as a perspective for deciding when judicial review is indispen-
sable. The broader issue has been aired in an exchange between Richard Epstein and Antonin Scalia.
Epstein urged active review, and Scalia wondered why public choice theorists, who are so skeptical
of the motives of legislators, are so pollyannish about judges. Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Review:
Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY (James A. Dorn &
Henry G. Manne eds., 1987); Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY, supra. Judge Alex Kozinski, writing a forward in the same volume,
seems to support an intermediate position. See Alex Kozinski, The Judiciary and the Constitution, in
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY, supra.
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and the list is enormous. 16 The purpose of my essay is to ask when judges
should invoke the takings clause and order the government to pay the
party who is burdened. My perspective is that of an economist and social
observer who regards judges as only a part, but a still necessary part, of
the enterprise of protecting individuals from the excesses of the state.
The Kozinski paradox illustrates one of those instances in which it is
necessary for judges to act under the takings clause to forestall unfair
behavior by the government.
Near the conclusion of his famous 1967 analysis of the takings issue,
Frank Michelman pauses and notes that his analysis comes down to the
"unamazing proposition that the true purpose of the just compensation
rule is to forestall evils associated with unfair treatment .... 1117 In her
exhaustive 1990 analysis of the Supreme Court cases and legal commen-
tary on takings jurisprudence in the decades since Michelman's article,
Andrea Peterson distills nearly the same conclusion.' 8 The takings issue
is about fairness. The question is how to make this "unamazing" princi-
ple operational. The present essay will show that economic inefficiency
provides a means by which judges can identify a class of controversies in
which fairness considerations demand that they, rather than political and
economic processes, have to act to ensure fairness. I do not claim that
this guide itself is a fairness test; Michelman's test is still the class in this
area, and it will be reviewed presently. My claim is that the Kozinski
paradox provides an important insight about where and when judges
must act if the words of the takings clause are to mean anything at all.
A. The Inefficiency of Rent Control and How Mobile
Homes Are Different
Although rent control is hardly a ubiquitous phenomenon in the
United States, its adoption has increased in recent years, 19 especially in
16. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985). He has since taken progressive income taxation off
his list of actions that constitute takings. Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and Politics of Dis-
trust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 43 (1992).
17. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1226 (1967).
18. "[T]he Justices evidently are deciding these cases according to their sense of when it is fair
for the government to take something of economic value from a private party without paying for it."
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part If-Takings as
Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 162 (1990).
19. See Kenneth Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 725 (1983). There is now a substantial literature by economists on conventional
(meaning apartments, not mobile homes) rent control. Edgar Olsen is the economists' dean of these
studies, in part because he lacks the partisanship that characterizes most commentators on rent
control. Edgar 0. Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J. POL. ECON. 93 (1972);
Edgar 0. Olsen, What Do Economists Know about the Effect of Rent Control on Housing Mainte-
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California since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.20 By 1988, more
than a quarter of all rental units in California were covered by rent con-
trol. 2 1 Among the tenants most successful in obtaining rent control regu-
lations were residents of mobile home parks. 22 By the middle 1980s,
more than a third of all mobile home units in California were in mobile
home parks subject to local rent control. Mobile home rent control
presents different issues than most apartment rent controls because of the
nature of the market.
Most mobile home coaches (as trailers and manufactured housing
units will be referred to here) are purchased by their occupants, not
rented. If the coach is brand new, it is usually transported to a rented
"pad" in a mobile home park. The move to the park is usually the last
time a coach is moved until it is scrapped. Immobility is especially obvi-
ous for the popular "double-wides," which are actually two units joined
along their length. When owners of a coach in a mobile home park want
to relocate their household, they usually sell the coach and move them-
selves and their furniture to a different housing unit, which may, of
course, be a "stick-built" home or apartment. The coach stays in place,
and its new owner moves in. The turnover in tenants of the mobile home
park is referred to as a vacancy, even though the coach itself does not
relocate. 23
One anxiety of tenants of mobile home parks is the possibility of
nance?, 1 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 295 (1988). Olsen was also a contributor to the excellent
survey by the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development. U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. AND
URBAN DEV., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON RENT CONTROL (Sept. 1991).
20. W. DENNIS KEATING, RENT CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA: RESPONDING TO THE HOUSING
CRISIS 3 (1983). Proposition 13 was said to have encouraged rent control because landlords did not
reduce rents in response to the deep cuts in property taxes. An explanation more consistent with
economic theory is that Proposition 13 reduced the cost of rent control to homeowners. One argu-
ment against rent control is that homeowners end up shouldering more of the property tax burden if
apartments are devalued. This argument became less persuasive after Proposition 13 because home-
owners' tax burdens essentially became fixed at one percent of 1975 or subsequent sale values. As a
result, California homeowners became less opposed to tenant demands for rent control.
21. Studies of the experience of cities with moderate rent controls suggest that there is little
distortion from controls that adjust regularly for inflation and permit vacancy decontrol. Michael
Murray et al., Analyzing Rent Control: The Case of Los Angeles, 29 EcON. INQUIRY 601 (1991). An
excellent study of the unusually stringent rent controls in Berkeley, California, demonstrates sub-
stantial reductions in the rental housing stock and on the value of remaining apartment building
normally predicted by elementary economic theory. Michael St. John, The Impact of Rent Control
on Property Values (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley).
22. On mobile home rent control and Hall, see Werner Z. Hirsch, An Inquiry into the Effects of
Mobile Home Park Rent Controls, 24 J. URB. EcON. 212 (1988); Joel G. Hirsch & Werner Z. Hirsch,
Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Va-
cancy Decontrols, 35 UCLA L. REV. 399 (1988); Mary E. McAlister, Hall v. City of Santa Barbara:
A New Look at California Rent Controls and the Takings Clause, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 179 (1990).
23. The separation of ownership of the structure from the land makes mobile home parks unu-
sual but not unique. Many homes in Hawaii are owned by residents who have long-term leases on
the land, as described in Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). The Hawaiian land
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eviction. Eviction imposes larger costs on mobile home tenants because
they not only must find another place themselves, as would regular apart-
ment dwellers, they may have to remove their coaches, too. Even neglect-
ing the nonpecuniary costs of changing homes and neighborhoods,
eviction looms larger for mobile home park tenants than for most other
tenants. The value of a used mobile home detached from its site is much
lower than those in place. (This may be because coaches are seldom
moved until they are old, but it also reflects the moving costs and the
value of an established tenancy even in the absence of government
regulations.)
California responded to tenant-coach owners' concerns legislatively
in the 1970s by adopting just-cause eviction laws that made it nearly im-
possible for a park owner to evict well-behaved tenants who pay their
rent.24 This by itself would not seem to be a burden on landlords, though,
since they normally had little desire to get rid of good tenants who paid
their rent regularly.25 The landlord's position is changed, however, under
rent control.
When real returns on apartment housing rentals are reduced by rent
control, landlords have an incentive to reduce prior investment in hous-
ing as well as forgo future investment in rental housing. Withdrawing
prior investment can be done by reducing maintenance of the unit or by
converting it to alternative uses such as offices or condominiums. In re-
sponse to this, both the state of California and local rent control jurisdic-
tions have adopted habitability laws and other regulations designed to
penalize undermaintenance, 26 and they have passed anti-conversion laws
leases also present rent-control problems. See Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 759 F.
Supp. 1477 (D. Haw. 1991).
24. A wealth of legal sources on mobile home legislation has been created as a result of litiga-
tion subsequent to Hall. The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed a California case that upheld mobile
home rent control, including the retention of controls upon vacancy, explicitly rejecting the analogy
of mobile-home rent control to physical invasion of Hall. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522
(1992), aff'g 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1990) (discussed infra notes 115-32 and accompanying
text). Hall and the California Yee opinion review the relevant state legislation, and for purposes of
this article I will not list statutes except when one is specifically mentioned.
25. An important exception arises when park owners seek to change their land to another use.
According to Paul Deffebach, Bay Area Regional Director for Local Government and Community
Relations of the Western Mobilehome Association (which represents park owners), some landown-
ers regarded the mobile home park as an interim land use, preferable to holding the land in its
unimproved state until such time as a commercial development became profitable. Interview with
Paul Deffebach (Dec. 16, 1991). Anti-eviction regulations have effectively frustrated the plans of
many owners who, in retrospect, probably would have been better off leaving the land vacant. See
also CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF Hous. & COMMUNITY DEV., ORDINANCES AND LAWS REGULATING
CHANGE OF USE OF MOBILEHOME PARKS (May 1987) (summarizing local ordinances, many of
which require park owner to pay each tenant relocation fees and costs, as well as extensive and
easily-challenged notice and procedural requirements).
26. The habitability and maintenance laws were adopted in part as common law changes rather
1991]
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intended to stem the flow of rental units to other uses. Enforcement of
maintenance and habitability laws is problematical for traditional apart-
ments. For apartments, common areas are normally maintained by the
owner, and remedies for an accumulation of minor infractions are hard
to obtain. It is possible to get an order to fix broken plumbing, but sel-
dom to paint the outside of the apartment, sweep the walks, or combat
general dinginess. Laws that prevent the conversion of rental units to
other uses can sometimes be evaded by the owner's reoccupying the unit
himself or withdrawing it from the market by demolition. Landlords can
also increase their rate of return under rent control by selecting what
they regard as high quality tenants, or they can indulge in personal pref-
erences that would be costly under normal market conditions. Harold
Demsetz found that during wartime rent control in Chicago, overt racial
discrimination appeared in newspaper ads for apartments, a practice that
had previously been rare. 27
Another inefficiency remains even if the maintenance and anti-evic-
tion police can do their job, or even if vacancy decontrol is permitted.
Tenants are apt to hold onto rent controlled apartments too long. For
example, parents may stay in a spacious apartment long after their chil-
dren have left home and a smaller unit would be more appropriate. Ten-
ants of rent-controlled apartments may be reluctant to take jobs in other
places because it means giving up the advantages of rent control. This is
true even if the other location has rent control, since the newcomer will
have higher search costs or will have to pay finders' fees to locate a unit.
Mobile home parks are a different story. Santa Barbara and many
other California communities adopted the panoply of rent control regula-
tions for their mobile home parks. But the usual inefficiencies that ac-
company such regulations were greatly mitigated by the tenant's
ownership of their coaches. It was primarily land rent, not capital re-
turns, that was regulated. Of course, the landlord in this case had pro-
vided much capital, including utility connections and a road network, as
well as the spot for the pad itself. But these required relatively little
maintenance, and some routine maintenance could be done by the tenant
coach-owners themselves.
A crucial feature of mobile home rent control is whether it has va-
than legislation, and they apply to all jurisdictions not just those with rent control. Edward H.
Rabin, The Revolution in Residental Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL
L. REV. 517, 521-27 (1984). "Failure to maintain" suits have been used extensively by California
mobile home park tenants to prevent park owners subject to rent control from reducing services.
27. Reported by Walter Block in William A. Fischel, Panel Discussion: Redistribution and Reg-
ulation of Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 767, 791 (1983).
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cancy decontrol. If pad rents continue to be controlled after the coach is
sold (recall that the coach remains on the pad), the buyer of the coach
will continue to get the benefits of rent control. Because the buyers know
this, they will be willing to pay more for coaches located in mobile home
parks in communities that impose rent control without vacancy decon-
trol. Vacancy control thus enables sellers of coaches to capitalize the
value of rent control in the sale of their coaches. For example, if the
market rents for a mobile home pad would have been $3000 per year, but
regulated rents are only $2000 per year for both the existing and future
tenants, the capitalized value of the $1000 subsidy will be incorporated in
the price of the coach that the new tenant would pay for the coach.
The hypothetical $1000 annual subsidy would be secure for future
tenants, since only coach owners could select buyers, and park owners
could not under California law deny occupation by any creditworthy
prospective tenant. Unlike the owners of apartment buildings who could
repossess rent-controlled units for their own use, an exception that is
usually allowed under anti-eviction statutes, the park owners would not
have the option of occupying the coaches for themselves, since the
coaches were the property of their occupants. (Park owners could, of
course, purchase the coaches when they came up for sale, but they would
then have to pay for the capitalized value of rent control on their own
land.)
Capitalization of the future benefits of rent control in coach sales
would depend both on how much rents were held below market values
and on buyers' estimates of how long rents would remain low under the
law. Rents were permitted to increase under Santa Barbara's ordinance
by the greater of three percent or three-quarters of the rise in the Con-
sumer Price Index. Thus if inflation were zero, in a few years the park
owners could charge market rents, though the permitted increase would
probably be reduced if inflation fell that much.28 Upon vacancy, the park
owner could also raise rents by ten percent. (Recall that "vacancy" in the
mobile home park context usually means sale of the coach in place; it
does not require removal of the coach as an eviction usually would.) Fur-
ther rent increases were allowed only by arbitration. Each of these con-
cessions to the landlord would reduce the capitalization of rent controls
in coaches.
We do not have to speculate about capitalization, though. In a coin-
28. Los Angeles rent control had in the 1970s permitted a maximum of 7.6 percent rent in-
creases for apartments. When inflation dipped below 7.6 percent in the 1980s, the Los Angeles city
council reduced the allowable increases to the rate of inflation. Murray et al., supra note 21, at 624.
19911
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
cidence of economic research with legal action, UCLA Economics Pro-
fessor Werner Hirsch and his son, attorney Joel Hirsch, were
undertaking a study of the effect of California mobile home rent controls
on the price of coaches at the very time that Hall v. City of Santa Bar-
bara was being litigated. 29 Hirsch and Hirsch estimated by regression
analysis that the value of coaches sold in rent-controlled communities
was one-third higher than that of coaches sold in other communities.
(Most other communities that had mobile home rent controls had the
same features as that of Santa Barbara, the most important being that
pad rents did not return to market rates when a vacancy occurred.) It
was clear that a large fraction of the rental value of the land had been
transferred to the owners of the coach by the combination of local rent
control (including especially the absence of vacancy decontrol) and state
and local laws that prevented park owners from selecting succeeding ten-
ants or otherwise controlling the use of their pads.
Because of the transferability of rent control (by not permitting va-
cancy decontrol or park owner repossession), some of the major ineffi-
ciencies that plague rent control in stick-built apartments were
substantially mitigated. Owners of mobile home coaches had incentives
to perform maintenance to make their units more saleable, so the most
visible and depreciable capital in the park would not become unduly run
down under rent control. Coach owners did not suffer the lock-in effect
that rent control imposes on tenants of most apartments. They had no
incentive to remain in their units once jobs or family situations had
changed, since they could take the financial benefit of rent control with
them in the form of a lump sum payment from the buyer of their coach.
It is the latter efficiency improvement that Judge Kozinski noted as em-
blematic of the unconstitutional takings aspect of the ordinance.
I originally suspected that this is an instance in which rent control
might create overmaintenance of the units. Tenant coach-owners in rent-
controlled parks might overmaintain their coaches to make them last
longer if, when the unit was worn out, it had to be replaced and the park
owner could then repossess the literally vacant space. I had underesti-
mated the creativeness of the mobile home tenants' lobby. State legisla-
tion prevents a park owner from interfering with tenants' ability to
replace their coaches. This law in conjunction with other tenant rights
laws effectively permits tenants to market the value of their low-rent
leaseholds even if they have run-down coaches. In an instance cited by
Judge Kozinski's opinion in a later mobile home takings case, a new ten-
29. Hirsch, supra note 22, at 213; Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 22, at 400.
[Vol. 67:865
EXPLORING THE KOZINSKI PARADOX
ant reported that she paid $77,000 for a coach in a Los Angeles mobile
home park.30 She sold the old coach for $5000 to someone who would
remove it and installed a new unit, candidly explaining that she paid
mainly for the value of the space.
Other inefficiencies, however, persisted under mobile home rent con-
trol. The number of new mobile home parks opened in California
dropped precipitously after mobile home rent control became widespread
in the early 1980s. 31 But that drop would probably have occurred even
under milder forms of rent control in which there was no capitalization.
As Professor Avinash Dixit argues in a recent issue of the Journal of
Political Economy, commitment of resources into an irreversible invest-
ment requires an above-average rate of return, and the required rate of
return increases substantially as the probability of a legal ceiling being
imposed increases. 32
The important point of Dixit's article for the present issue is that
any rate of return below market rates will discourage entry. According to
Dixit's model, entry into the mobile home park business would have been
deterred even without the capitalization of rent control in the coach mar-
ket. Thus the long-run inefficiencies of rent control are not worsened by
Santa Barbara's ordinance, and several of the short-run inefficiencies are
mitigated by it. Moreover, the lack of new parks was mitigated by Cali-
fornia state legislation in 1980 and 1981 that limited the ability of local
governments to restrict placement of mobile homes on foundations in
regular residential zones. 33 In such instances, the coach owner is also the
land owner, and none of the rent control issues applies. The only obvious
efficiency problem is that new owners must now pay for both land and
capital costs, and the higher down payment may deter some potential
residents, especially if banks are reluctant to accept as security the capi-
talized value of rent control.
30. Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 578 (9th Cir. 1991), withdrawn,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17358 (9th Cir. 1992).
31. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 22, at 463; CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HOUS. & COMMUNITY
DEV., MOBILEHOME PARKS IN CALIFORNIA: A SURVEY OF MOBILEHOME PARK OWNERS 4 (Feb.
1986) [hereinafter OWNER SURVEY].
32. Avinash K. Dixit, Irreversible Investment with Price Ceilings, 99 J. POL. ECON. 541 (1991).
33. These are described in CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HoUs. & COMMUNITY DEV., LOCAL GOV-
ERNMENT MOBILEHOME AND MORILEHOME PARK POLICIES IN CALIFORNIA: A SURVEY OF CITY
AND COUNTY PLANNING DIRECTORS (June 1986) [hereinafter PLANNERS SURVEY]. The survey
indicated general compliance with the law that local zoning not impede placement of mobile homes
in general residential districts (CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65852.3, .7 (Deering 1992)). A law passed in
1989 implicitly conceded the supply retardation effects of rent control by disallowing rent control on
new mobile home parks built in California. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 798.45, .7 (Deering 1992). The effect
of this law will depend on whether potential park developers believe it will not be changed to their
detriment sometime in the future.
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The Pareto-superiority criterion for efficiency requires that someone
be made better off and no one else be made worse off by a proposed
policy. Adoption of rent control itself does not meet that criterion, since
landlords are almost always made worse off. The efficiency superiority of
mobile home rent control is solely in comparison to rent control of regu-
lar apartments. In regular apartment rent control, the owner's rate of
return is diminished, and the tenant gets lower rents. But because she has
no market in which to sell her right to a low-rent apartment, the tenant's
advantage is gradually diminished. (I assume that subletting is illegal, as
it normally is in conventional rent control, and that it is costly to evade
the law.) The sitting tenant forgoes a job in another city, she forgoes an
apartment in a better neighborhood, all to keep the low-rent apartment.
Now plug the same set of controls into the mobile home case, and
we see that the landlord (in this case, the mobile home park owner) is, on
the assumption that both rent-control ordinances are equally durable, 34
no worse off than his counterpart in the apartment house business, while
his tenant is better off: she can capitalize the value of rent control when
she sells the coach. If the coach owner wants to take a job elsewhere or
move to another park, she can in effect take her rent control with her,
since she can sell her old coach at a higher value. It is in this comparative
sense that mobile home rent control represents an efficiency gain over the
same regulations applied to apartment-house rent control.
The legal basis for Judge Kozinski's decision was not formally based
on the efficiency criterion. Instead, he argued that the combined effect of
the state and local regulations was to transfer a possessory interest from
park owner to coach owner. This new possessory interest constituted a
permanent physical invasion of the park owner's property, which is al-
most always a per se taking under the Loretto test.35 As I indicated
above, this characterization is plausible. Under the web of state and local
regulations, a park owner has no reasonable expectation of ever being
able to occupy the pads in his park without the leave of his tenants. This
does not mean that the park owner is bereft of any economic value from
his land; he still is entitled to the controlled rent, and this stream is valu-
able. Hence Judge Kozinski did not base his decision on loss of value,
34. The qualification about equal durability is necessary because, as I argue below, efficient rent
control is apt to last longer than inefficient rent control. Because of this, the apartment landlord is
apt to feel less demoralized about his loss than the mobile home park owner. See infra note 56 and
accompanying text for a discussion of demoralization costs.
35. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), discussed infra
notes 108-14 and accompanying text. See also my discussion of "regulation chopping" infra text
accompanying notes 124-28, which indicates the importance of Kozinski's looking at the entire effect
of the web of regulation rather than at each regulation by itself.
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since loss of some value as the result of regulation is usually not by itself
regarded as a compensable taking.
The two other judges on the panel hearing the Hall appeal agreed
with Kozinski, and the Ninth Circuit declined to set up a nine-judge en
banc rehearing of the case.36 The dissent to the decision not to rehear
Hall en banc pointed out that the holding goes against almost all prece-
dents regarding rent control in that circuit as well as those of the U.S.
Supreme Court. 37 The reasoning closest to that in Hall was a dissent by
Chief Justice Rehnquist from a decision not to grant certiorari to a Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, rent control/just-cause eviction appeal. 38 Justice
Rehnquist sought to extend the physical invasion standard to what is
regarded by the state court as a noncompensable regulation.
The physical invasion/regulation distinction is venerable in takings
jurisprudence. It supposedly creates a bright-line test for determining the
sufficient conditions for a compensable taking of property. The govern-
ment lays a finger on your land (or causes someone else to), and it has to
pay. "Mere" regulation, however, is not usually a taking unless the value
of the property is reduced to zero, and even then some regulations will be
upheld. 39 While courts ritually invoke Justice Holmes's words in Penn-
sylvania Coal to the effect that a regulation that "goes too far" requires
compensation,g° few display much inclination to actually award
compensation.
B. Kozinski's Paradox and Economic Policy
This section has two related objectives in exploring Kozinski's para-
dox. The first is to show that the paradox does not necessarily arise from
the cashing out of regulations, even rent control regulations. Second, I
show by reference to the economics of taxation that the paradox is not
simply about transferring land rents; lots of land rent could be trans-
36. Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 813 F.2d 198, 209 (9th Cir. 1987).
37. 813 F.2d at 209 (Schroder, J., dissenting). One other circuit had relied on the Hall reason-
ing to hold a New Jersey community's mobile home rent control a taking without just compensation.
Pinewood Estates v. Barnegat Township Leveling Bd., 898 F.2d 347, 354-55 (3d Cir. 1990).
38. Fresh Pond Shopping Center v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983). Massachusetts courts had
previously upheld a Cambridge ordinance that prevented an owner from evicting a tenant in order to
occupy it himself. Flynn v. Cambridge, 418 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1981).
39. I do not here explore the conditions in which a regulation might be regarded as a taking
except to note that the landowner has a severe legal burden to overcome to collect damages, a
burden almost as severe as that in which the government must bear to argue that a physical invasion
does not require compensation. For a review of the current state of U.S. Supreme Court doctrine on
this, see Peterson, supra note 18. A recent takings case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 133-38, discusses the conditions under which regulations
that leave property with no economic use must be compensated.
40. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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ferred from the private to the public sector without invoking a taking. In
the following section, I show that the paradoxical efficiency reason for
invoking the takings clause in Hall is consistent with Frank Michelman's
utilitarian-economic theory of when compensation should be paid.
1. Cashing Out Regulations
As I noted in the first section of this article, my research on land use
controls has led me to the conclusion that they are inefficiently restric-
tive. One road to efficiency is to apply the takings clause more vigorously
to local regulations. But even this remedy would leave in place many
zoning regulations of dubious efficiency, and an additional remedy is nec-
essary. The second half of my proposed cure for zoning's excesses is to
take a cue from Professor Coase and acknowledge that local govern-
ments possess such entitlements and promote free trade in zoning. To be
specific, let communities, or, as Robert Nelson suggests, neighborhoods,
sell exceptions to zoning restrictions that they collectively value less than
developers. 41 The analogous method for dealing with rent control is to
permit tenants to sell the right to decontrol their apartments. Fungible
rent control is in fact advanced by economist Michael Wolkoff without
apparent concern over its constitutionality.42
The problem that Kozinski's paradox presents to the foregoing poli-
cies is that the clear efficiency gain from the exchange seems to suggest
that cashing out regulations itself is a taking. This would surely be the
case if the regulation were passed solely for the purpose of raising reve-
nue by selling exceptions to it.43 There are two ways to deter such oppor-
tunism. One would be to more closely scrutinize police power regulations
on a "harm-prevention" standard.44 If we were confident that all regula-
tions were legitimate, we would have little reason to object if the govern-
ment decided to endure some harms in exchange for cash. (If this seems
crass, think of the uses of the cash to reduce some other harm that can-
41. ROBERT NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 21 (1977).
42. See Michael Wolkoff, Property Rights to Rent Regulated Apartments: A Path Towards De-
control, 9 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 260 (1990). I have argued elsewhere that the Nollan deci-
sion's insistence on a "nexus" between a regulation's stated purpose and its actual impact makes
trade more difficult. See Fischel, supra note 13 (commenting on the 1987 takings decisions, including
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)). Kozinski's paradox is, I argue in the
present article, more insightful as to the source of anxiety about uncompensated regulatory transfers
of wealth than Justice Scalia's nexus test.
43. The anxiety about such opportunistic use of regulation is explored in Stewart Sterk, Nollan,
Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731 (1988).
44. For an explication of a modern version of the harm-prevention standard, see Robert C.
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 405
(1977).
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not be prevented by regulation, such as providing schools to reduce
illiteracy.)
The other way to forestall opportunism is to require the government
to wait a long time before accepting cash for rescinding the regulation.
Those who would benefit from the money would be removed by time
from those who adopted the regulation. The case for cashing out by ne-
gotiation New York City's rent controls, which were the object of
Michael Wolkoff's proposal, is more compelling because New York has
had rent controls continuously for more than fifty years. Whatever the
rationale for adopting and maintaining rent controls, it cannot have been
simply as a scheme by which the city could raise money.45
The primary difference between California mobile home tenants and
New York City apartment tenants is that mobile home regulation is rela-
tively new, and its constitutionality was unsettled from the beginning.
Although city attorneys might have regarded California's state constitu-
tional holdings as providing security for almost any rent-control regula-
tion, the federal courts' decisions were more problematical. Because of
the youth of such regulations, devices that cash them out, such as in the
market for coaches, are automatically suspect, especially if the benefi-
ciaries are identical to those who urged passage of the regulation.
2. Taxation and Rent Transfer
To explore another aspect of Kozinski's paradox, consider another
situation in which land rents are transferred efficiently. The economic
theory of efficient taxation requires that taxes be levied in such a way that
private economic behavior is not altered. This does not mean that an
efficient tax is a painless tax. It still transfers resources from an individ-
ual's control to the government's control, often to the considerable disap-
pointment of the individual. (Cartoon depicting one prosperous
eighteenth century American saying to another, "You know, taxation
with representation isn't so great, either.")
The classic example of the efficient tax is a tax on land rent. This
insight was the basis for Henry George's single-tax movement. 46
George's idea lives on in modern optimal tax theory, which attempts a
45. The newness of the regulation may distinguish the Municipal Art Society case, in which the
New York courts overturned a deal by the city to give a developer more favorable zoning in ex-
change for the builder's paying a higher price for the city's land. Municipal Art Society v. City of
New York, 522 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1987). See Jerold Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for
an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 3 (1991).
46. See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (1879).
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kind of second-best Georgist rule by, roughly speaking, taxing commodi-
ties in proportion to how inelastic their demand or supply schedules
are. 47 George's land tax has also been applied to urban economics to
show that it is the optimal tax for an urban area.48 If we take Kozinski's
paradox literally, a lot of economic policy would be in trouble.
An obvious and important difference between land taxes and Santa
Barbara's mobile home regulation is that, in most instances, taxes apply
to a large number of people, while mobile home rent control requires a
very small number of persons to bear its burden. Had the city taxed the
land rents of every resident to subsidize the well-being of mobile home
coach owners, we would be much less upset about the policy, even
though the source of revenue was land rent. It seems also a good deal less
likely that the ordinance would have passed, although there is no reason
for a judge to presume this.
The obvious reason why we economists believe there is a difference
between Santa Barbara's mobile home rent control scheme and an effi-
cient tax is that the burden is spread out more under the tax, so no indi-
vidual feels quite as bad. But this challenges our utilitarian calculus. If
we didn't like a tax of amount X when one person of population N bears
it, why should we prefer it when the amount is written (X/N)N?
One response is the declining marginal utility of income and its co-
rollary, risk aversion. 49 If people are risk averse, then, ceteris paribus, tax
burdens should be spread more widely. We could frame this as a choice
between a lottery as to who provides X versus a uniform assessment of
each person of X/N to pay for X.
But risk aversion does not, I submit, cover all of the cases in which
we would think that the mobile home park rent transfer is economically
questionable. To get at this, assume that the Halls are risk neutral, or
that they have had an opportunity to spread their assets enough to self
insure, or even that they purchased insurance from a third party not wor-
ried about moral hazard and adverse selection. Even in this case, I sub-
mit, there is a case against imposing the burden on the Halls. What I
want to argue in the following section is that the Kozinski paradox
47. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 291 (5th ed. 1989).
48. The modem progenitor of the "Henry George theorem" is Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of
Local Public Goods, in ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC SERVICES (Martin S. Feldstein & Robert P. Inman
eds., 1977).
49. On risk aversion as a reason for compensation, see Lawrence Blume & Daniel Rubinfeld,
Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984). An economic model
that generates a just compensation rule without risk aversion is Fischel & Shapiro, Constitutional
Choice Model, supra note 12.
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points to a type of cost often neglected by economists. There is a good
reason for the neglect, of course, since most economic policies, such as
taxation and most national regulations, spread their burdens widely if
not evenly.
To further motivate this inquiry, I report the results of a presenta-
tion I made in 1987 at the National Tax Association's Committee on
Local Nonproperty Taxation. (This committee covers all local taxes ex-
cept the property tax.) Attending were about twenty practitioners and
scholars of public finance. I presented evidence that many communities
were using land use exactions to finance local expenditures that were
only distantly related to the project that occasioned the exaction. I ar-
gued that exactions could at least in principle be efficient insofar as they
represented increments to land value from rezoning the property. 50 The
Committee members seemed to grasp the logic of this argument.
They didn't like it at all. Even when I pointed out the similarity of
such exactions to a land tax, with which most were comfortable in princi-
ple, no one in the room regarded this as an improvement in public fi-
nance. This leads me to believe that economists do not themselves accept
a version of efficiency that takes no account of distributional fairness.
Rather than just say that fairness is something economists don't have to
think about, I want to argue here that fairness can be integrated into
economics. This will not require a great adjustment in economic analysis,
since most economic policies still involve situations in which the question
of concentrated individual burdens does not arise. But integration of fair-
ness into the notion of efficiency will help evaluate the regulatory takings
question.
C. Michelman's Two Demoralization Costs and Land Rent Transfers
Frank Michelman's article5 1 is twenty-five years old and, if citations
are any indication, still highly influential.5 2 I recapitulate some of its
analysis here because I have noticed that being widely-cited does not nec-
essarily mean that it is widely read. I should also point out that the utili-
tarian balancing approach that Michelman articulated has, even when it
is not patently misunderstood, most often been invoked to buttress the
50. The argument is presented in Fischel, supra note 12. I had presented the same argument to
groups of lawyers and of planners, who had the same reaction as the economists and tax experts, but
I attributed their negative reaction partly to not grasping the efficiency of a tax on land rent.
51. Michelman, supra note 17.
52. It is the eighth most cited law journal article on any subject. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most
Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540, 1550 (1985).
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finding of no compensation in regulatory takings litigation. 53
Michelman's utilitarian approach to takings is in form very much
like the simple economic rule of public investment. For any given pro-
ject, minimize the net costs. Michelman's principal variation is that he
thought of a type of cost that economists and others still have a hard
time grasping. I will explain the formula first, because it is so easy, and
then the nature of the peculiar cost term.
Any public measure, whether it is construction of a highway or
adoption of a zoning regulation, will create some benefits, B, and require
some inputs, whose cost is C. For highways, the inputs are land, labor
and capital, and they are normally paid without a second thought. For a
regulation, the chief "input" is the opportunity cost of the resources that
are either withheld from alternative uses or compelled to be supplied by
the regulation.
If the government decided to go through with a project,
Michelman's working assumption was that B > C, no more than that. It
was not necessarily the best project, but it was not irrational, either. His
heuristic focus for the just compensation question was not on forcing the
government to calculate immediate benefits and costs correctly, but to
see why a "rational" government should actually pay the costs once they
became apparent. 54 This led to defining and then choosing the lesser of
two different costs.
The first of the two is settlement costs, S. These are simply all the
costs that the government endures if it does decide to pay C (or, one
presumes, any fraction of C). S does not include the dollar value of C
itself, an exclusion that has confused generations of readers, including at
one time this author. Settlement costs are rather all of the bad things that
happen if the government does decide to pay.
One obvious interpretation of S is the transaction cost of making the
payment: the agency must identify who is eligible for the payment, win-
now out those who are not, negotiate with owners, try an eminent do-
main case if negotiations fail, do the paper work of authorizing payment,
and transfer whatever legal titles are required. The deadweight loss of
additional taxes needed to finance the compensation should also be in-
53. The opinion most consciously derived from Michelman is Penn Cent. Transp. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which invoked his "investment backed expectations" phrase to help
determine whether the city's preventing the use of air rights over Grand Central Terminal was a
taking. It was held not to be. Id. at 138.
54. But see Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333 (1991), in
which he cautions against the risk of political forces shifting private activities to the government if
the government is not required to compensate. See also Louis De Alessi, Implications of Property
Rights for Government Investment Choices, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 13 (1969).
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cluded in S, though the amount of tax revenue itself would not, since that
is itself equal to C plus other kinds of S for which direct cash outlays are
necessary. (Deadweight loss of taxation is the value of product sacrificed
by the private sector that the public sector is unable to appropriate for
itself.)
A less obvious component of settlement costs, recently pointed out
by several economists, is the moral hazard implicit in paying just com-
pensation.55 If compensation is always made for roads, landowners are
apt to not account for the impending taking and erect buildings that will
shortly have to be demolished. Such wasted investment is socially costly,
and a rational government would want to take it into account in deciding
on compensation rules.
Settlement costs include some subtleties, but their nature is at least
familiar to the tribe that brandishes the term "cost" most often. The
other side of Michelman's utilitarian calculus is demoralization cost,
which contains two aspects, one of which is less familiar to economists.
Demoralization costs are all of the bad things that occur when the gov-
ernment chooses not to compensate. To complete the formula before ex-
ploring the nature of demoralization, the utilitarian (and economic) rule
is for the government to endure the lesser of settlement costs and demor-
alization costs. If the social costs of not paying (=demoralization) are
greater than the social costs of paying (= settlement), then pay. If demor-
alization costs are low and settlement costs are high, don't pay.
What are the bad consequences, the demoralization costs, of not
paying? An obvious one is that if government does not pay for resources
it appropriates, people in the future will be reluctant to expose their re-
sources to the risk of being appropriated by the government. A common
scenario is that a record of not compensating will cut investment, since
investors will add the risk of uncompensated expropriation (including
cost increases due to uncompensated regulations) to the natural deter-
rents to committing resources for future use. 56
This is a close calculation, since, as previously mentioned, one does
not want property owners to risk too much investment, lest it be wasted
when the government does take it. 7 Moreover, under the invasion/regu-
55. Lawrence Blume, et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J.
EcON. 71 (1984); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985). The moral hazard principle was cited by Justice Stevens in dissent in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2922 n.5 (1992) (citing Daniel Farber, Economic
Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 125 (1992)).
56. Michelman, supra note 17, at 1214-18.
57. See William Fisher, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1774, 1779 n.25 (1988).
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lation distinction, too much investment might occur if landowners antici-
pate adoption of more restrictive regulations. They may rush to complete
buildings they otherwise would have waited to do, knowing that once
they are complete they are usually safe from uncompensated removal.
Thus the better term for the result of this kind of demoralization cost is
"suboptimal" investment rather than "too little" investment.
While economists are comfortable with the suboptimal investment
scenario, another component of demoralization cost is less familiar to
them. This component is the disutility arising from having your property
taken by someone else, even if your economic behavior is unaltered by
the taking. Such disutility is the feeling of being had, analogous to the
incremental disutility of having a possession stolen rather than simply
losing it. It is what makes the question of just compensation different
from the question of damages for accidents.58 Such unfairness demorali-
zation is the essence of the problem in Hall, since, as I have argued, the
mobile home park owners' economic behavior is not significantly altered
by Santa Barbara's rent control ordinance.
There is an incongruity of the "unfairness" aspect of demoralization
costs with economic theory as it is usually applied in a policy context.
The "disinvestment" aspect of demoralization costs is clearly identified
with economic inefficiency. But the unfairness aspect of demoralization is
invisible. Behavior of the victim is not changed. This is not to say that I
think that the behavior of plaintiffs in Hall was not changed by the ordi-
nance. It is only that this particular rent regulation induced much less
inefficient behavioral changes than other rent control laws, or other regu-
lations in general. Hall thus becomes a loose paradigm of the pure unfair-
ness aspect of demoralization cost.
I emphasize the difference between the two types of demoralization
costs because it is important to my theory of an appropriate judicial role
in enforcing the takings clause. The disinvestment aspect of demoraliza-
tion reduces future production and so imposes a cost on some other peo-
ple. If those on whom the cost falls have some influence on the question
of whether to compensate or not, something is apt to be done to mitigate
the economic consequences. The anticipation of this possibility reduces
the unfairness aspect of demoralization cost. Shirking, after all, is one
response to the taking of one's labor without sufficient compensation, as
Vietnam-era draftees knew and the U.S. government eventually
58. Michelman is explicit about the difference between a taking by the government and the loss
of something by accident, the latter having been addressed by Calabresi's economic analysis of tort
law. Michelman, supra note 17, at 1169 n.5 and 1216-17. The accident/taking distinction is expli-
cated in Fischel & Shapiro, Takings, supra note 12, at 282.
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learned. 59
The inability of governments to deal with shirking and other mani-
festations of elastic supply such as emigration is one reason that govern-
ments everywhere usually compensate people for their labor services. But
when no shirking is possible so that the lost production aspect is nil, I
submit that the unfairness aspect of demoralization is actually increased.
This is one interpretation of why surveys consistently find that people
regard price increases during periods of extraordinary demand increases
as unfair. 60 The short-run demand curve is nearly vertical so that there is
virtually no opportunity to avoid the price increase.
It is the unavoidability of pure land rent transfers that forms one of
two necessary conditions for judicial intervention in my analysis. Demor-
alization costs that reduce current or future production are more likely
to be subject to legislative correction, since some rational group of people
will perceive that this is a bad idea and sooner or later form a coalition to
defeat or at least mitigate the cause of their misery. (This assumes the
second necessary condition, which I discuss in more detail later, that
those who bear the burden of lost production have meaningful access to
the political process that makes the decision.)
It is important to recall that Michelman described his settlement
and demoralization cost framework as a general rule, not one that neces-
sarily compelled courts to act. It is consistent with his framework to ask
when a judge should compel compensation, and when the logic of utilita-
rian calculus is sufficient to compel a government to offer compensation
(which may be implicit or in-kind) without the prod of a judicial deci-
sion. The pure rent transfer coupled with a political process that affords
no hope of relief is a taking that only an independent judiciary can cure.
The distinction that I draw here is similar to that which Michelman
drew between the confidence that the political process operates as a "fair-
ness machine," whose self-interested structural characteristics assure
fairness, and the lack of such confidence, which requires a "fairness disci-
pline" extrinsic to the political process. 61 This interpretation of
59. P. J. O'ROURKE, GIVE WAR A CHANCE 215 (1991), remarked on the upbeat, highly moti-
vated attitude of (professional) U.S. troops during the Persian Gulf war, in distinct contrast to the
(mostly conscripted) soldiers who served in Vietnam.
60. Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, 76 AM. ECON. REV.
728 (1986). In a letter to me, Daniel Farber added two examples of direct conflict between efficiency
and fairness: the English poll tax and monopoly price discrimination. Both are more efficient than
their alternatives (general property taxes and nondiscriminating monopoly, respectively), but both
are despised all the more for their efficiency. Letter from Daniel Farber to William A. Fischel (Apr.
17, 1992) (on file with author).
61. Michelman, supra note 17, at 1246.
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Michelman's article resolves a much misunderstood comment in it.
Michelman said that the takings question often should be resolved by
parties other than judges, which, I submit, will normally be the case for
demoralizations that give rise to visible inefficiency borne by the
electorate.
My contribution to the question of reliance on the "fairness
machine" is that its operation is less likely to work at the local govern-
ment level. Local government involves less log rolling and less delibera-
tion than state or national governments. 62 Local governments typically
have only a single legislative chamber, of which the executive is either an
integral part or a civil-service agent. The three political examinations-
lower house, upper house, and executive-that a measure must get at the
federal level and in all states except Nebraska are collapsed into one at
the local level.
The discipline that local governments are apt to respond to is the
threat of relocation to more favorable jurisdictions. Thus excessive local
regulation of portable assets is largely self-restraining. But the crucial
aspect of this mechanism is that the asset be removable. 63 The economic
consequences of higher prices, local inconvenience, and lost jobs are not
present for locally determined redistributions of land rent or of assets
made immobile by regulation. This is why the "efficient" mobile home
regulation of Hall fails Michelman's utilitarian test and why courts must
exert the fairness discipline in such instances.
Pure rent capture does not, I should add, necessarily give rise to the
unfairness aspect of demoralization cost. It might be reduced by moral
education. My friend Nic Tideman has long been dedicated to the princi-
ples of Henry George, and he consistently advances the moral case
against private ownership of natural resources.6 To the extent that peo-
ple are persuaded by this, a transfer of pure land rent, which derives from
a natural resource, will not be regarded as demoralizing. A great deal of
62. This is a matter of political theory, and other situations may be argued to require a fairness
discipline. Perhaps a most dramatic instance occurs when the Endangered Species Act imposes sub-
stantial burdens on only a few landowners. Here the level of government is national, so that when a
large number of landowners and sympathizers are burdened, as in the spotted owl controversy, there
is an impetus to a political settlement. When only a small group of landowners is affected, though, a
fairness discipline may be necessary even when the regulations are adopted by the national govern-
ment. See Geoffrey Harrison, The Endangered Species Act and Ursine Usurpations: A Grizzly Tale of
Two Takings, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101 (1991).
63. The immobility of assets at the local level is the key to an innovative theory of takings
advanced in a preliminary manuscript by attorney George B. Wyeth. George B. Wyeth, Takings and
Exploitation (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
64. See, e.g., Nicolaus Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and Justice, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1714 (1988).
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environmental education seems to be an attempt to convince people that
ownership of many natural resources ought not to be privately appropri-
ated. To the extent that these social movements succeed, forced transfers
are less demoralizing. But it must be clear that this new consciousness
does not arise simply because public officials assert that that is how peo-
ple should feel. The best test is that normal people do not in fact object to
land rent transfers, a proposition apparently denied by the volume of
litigation on the takings issue even when the prospect of financial gain by
the plaintiff seems slim.
I have in this section suggested that there is a difference between
demoralization costs that manifest themselves as suboptimal investment
and those that result in feelings of being unfairly put upon. I suggested
that the unfairness form of demoralization is the one appropriate for
judges to focus on. For many people, this will seem too narrow. Rent
control for regular housing gives rise to demoralization costs of the more
familiar disinvestment incentives and suboptimal tenures. Why shouldn't
this be called a taking, too?
Now, it may be that Judge Kozinski would like to find the ordinary
rent control ordinance a taking, too, as Professor Epstein does.65 I would
also like to discourage rent control, but I am a little more reluctant to
suggest that judges do so. The reason is that the disinvestment aspect of
regular rent control along with the political participation mitigation of
fairness costs sows the seeds to get rid of or to substantially mitigate rent
control without the help of judges. I think that judges normally ought
not to hold that a regulatory transfer is a taking unless the regulation is
too efficient (i.e., it is a transfer of pure rents), and it is adopted outside of
the give-and-take of pluralistic politics. This derives from my view of the
role of judges in constitutional theory, and so I must digress to that
subject.
D. Exit and Voice as Protectors of Constitutional Liberty
I take as given the idea that the takings clause was adopted, in John
Hart Ely's words, as "yet another protection of the few against the
many."' 66 Evidence that this idea retains its appeal is the succinct and
often quoted statement by Justice Hugo Black that
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee .. . [is] designed to bar Govern-
65. Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 741, 758 (1988) ("Hall reaches the right result because all rent controls are unconstitutional,
not because this statute is worse than others.").
66. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 97
(1980).
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ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 67
As I mentioned in the first section, academic writers have often noted the
importance of fairness in broadly explaining takings doctrines.
Revealed preference for the vitality of this idea is that at least half of
the state constitutions strengthened the language of their takings clauses
in the late nineteenth century. This was a popular reaction to compensa-
tion practices by the railroads, which were granted the power of eminent
domain by the states. Railroad developers would often take part of a
parcel of land and point out in court that the remaining property had
risen in value, thereby often reducing "just compensation" to zero. 68
Even though this practice may actually have been efficiency enhancing in
many cases (amounting to a "windfalls for wipeouts" arrangement pro-
posed by the late Don Hagman 69), the perceived unfairness of a burden
on particular individuals made it unacceptable in the long run.70
Richard Epstein has argued in his 1985 book, Takings, that the tak-
ings clause requires the courts to overrule a great deal of regulation at all
levels of government. Rent control, most zoning, the NLRB, and mini-
mum wages would all fall to the judicial ax. Epstein's book has been
harshly criticized by other scholars because they regard the result of a
libertarian system as a plutocratic rule by the rich.7 1 This criticism seems
to overlook the extent to which the existing knot of regulation that Ep-
stein would cut preserves the privileges of the affluent against the on-
slaught of unfettered capitalism. Suburban exclusionary zoning comes to
mind.72
4
67. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), quoted in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987) (Scalia, J.); see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Harry Scheiber, Property Law. Expropriation and Resource Allocation by Government, 1789-
1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 132, 140
(Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988).
69. Donald G. Hagman, Compensable Regulations, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (Donald G.
Hagman & Dean Misczynski eds., 1978).
70. The unfairness was not that the landowner was worse off than before, but that he was worse
off relative to his neighbors, who gained from the public project without any loss at all. This is
explained in Prudential Ins. v. Central Nebraska Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 296 N.W. 752 (Neb.
1941).
71. See, e.g., Thomas Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 47 (1986).
72. For some reason, exclusionary zoning fails to come to Frank Michelman's mind when he
defends deferential judicial review of takings as allowing a desirable means of redistributing income.
See Frank L. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 91,
99-105 (1992). Michelman was responding to Epstein's revision of his original theory, which disal-
lowed the welfare state entirely. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 281. The revised Epstein would allow
systematic redistributions of income from rich to poor under the Takings Clause, but only if financed
by general taxation. See Epstein, supra note 16, at 43, which further advances judicial activism on
behalf of property by analogy to judicial activism on behalf of the First Amendment.
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My problem with Epstein's remedy is that I hesitate to assign to the
courts such an encompassing role in enforcing the takings clause. It is
not just the limited capacities of judges that disturbs me, though that is
surely important in an operational sense. The more fundamental reason
is my belief that in the long run, democratic political processes are firmer
guarantees of individual freedoms, including economic freedoms, than
any intellectual apparatus imposed upon them.
Perhaps what convinced me most of this was the prescient forecast
by the Marxist economist, John Roemer, in 1980. John was a colleague
when I was visiting the University of California at Davis in that aca-
demic year. He is a highly respected economic theorist and a personally
dedicated Marxist, a rare combination even back then. At a department
seminar, Roemer was asked what he thought of the Soviet-required sup-
pression of the Solidarity movement in Poland that was going on at the
time. He said something to the effect that it was unfortunately necessary
to tolerate such oppressive moves to preserve the long-run evolutionary
path of socialism. After all, he said, if they bring back democracy, they'll
bring back capitalism.
They did, and they did.
My more immediate task is to explain why judicial review of most
economic regulations adopted in a democratic society should not be held
by judges to require just compensation and why a few others should. A
theory of takings has to fit into a more general theory of constitutional
interpretation. For this purpose, I subscribe to the general approach of
John Hart Ely's "process" theory. 73 Its key to the interpretation of the
"open-ended" clauses, such as the due process and takings clauses, is that
courts should inquire as to whether the democratic process is functioning
properly. Constitutional courts are thus most concerned with en-
franchisement, voting rules, and discrimination against "discrete and in-
sular minorities," to borrow Justice Stone's famous phrase from footnote
four of Caroline Products, who are easily discounted in some democratic
processes. 74
The scholarly criticism of Ely's work has pointed out that there are
many substantive parts of the Constitution, so a process theory is incom-
plete.75 Whatever the validity of such criticism-it does not seem to me
73. ELY, supra note 66. An especially able and appealing defense of Ely's approach is Michael
J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991).
74. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
75. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theo-
ries, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). Tribe invoked the takings clause in passing as an example of substan-
tive rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. at 1065.
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that process theory denies the explicit substantive values. The major
Constitutional issues have been about clauses like the takings clause that
are in fact open to interpretation. The definitions of property, taking, just
compensation, and public use are all matters that leave more than a little
latitude for disagreement. A related criticism by Professor Paul Brest
emphasizes the difficulty a process theory has in selecting which catego-
ries require protection from procedural defects. 76 Is that not a substan-
tive question?
My employment of Ely's approach for takings analysis suffers less
from Brest's objection because there is a standard by which victims of
democratic excess can be identified: they are a minority 77 in a jurisdiction
in which the usual minoritarian political protections are attenuated-
that is, they are subject to local governments or to politically insulated
special commissions, and they possess assets whose regulation cannot be
escaped by moving them to other jurisdictions or other employments.
Moreover, the remedy to be followed does not require that judges actu-
ally substitute their policies for those of elected officials. The government
can continue its policies as long as it pays. The takings clause is a right to
a remedy-just compensation-not a substantive right to noninterference
by the government.
The appeal of Ely's approach is that it regards the Supreme Court as
one of several institutions that protect constitutional liberty. The exist-
ence of three separate branches of government, the pluralistic nature of
politics, and the difficulty of granting effect to laws that constrain liberty
in a nation in which people can move about are at least as important
guarantors of liberty as the pronouncements of judges. Legal central-
ism-the assumption that legal rules determine conduct-is as question-
able a source of Constitutional liberty as Robert Ellickson found it was in
76. Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981). In a similar vein, Justice
Lewis Powell asked how courts are to know what substantive outcome would have been achieved
had the "discrete and insular" group not been effectively disfranchised. See Lewis Powell, Carolene
Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
77. The special minority protection of Ely's theory and Carolene's Footnote Four troubles both
Ely and Klarman because of the "burglar exception": burglars are a despised minority, but surely
the Constitution should not protect them. ELY, supra note 66, at 154; Klarman, supra note 73, at
787. I would define a minority that is "discrete and insular" to be one whose condition is effectively
immutable in order to avoid this difficulty and to get to the heart of Footnote Four's distinction.
Burglars can refrain from stealing, and penalties on burgling are designed to deter potential thieves,
not extract a tax from them. (Indeed, in the absence of any penalties, burglars might not be a minor-
ity.) Race, on the other hand, is an immutable characteristic. Ancestry, national origin, and, for the
most part, religion, are also, to use the economist's term, almost perfectly inelastic in supply. Pos-
sessing XY chromosomes is, too, but, as Ely points out, it does not make women a political minority
in need of special judicial protection after suffrage. ELY, supra note 66, at 164-70.
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establishing order among rural neighbors in Shasta County, California. 78
Because of this, an economical judiciary-one that rationally re-
sponds to its limited ability to analyze issues and enforce its results-will
want to use its resources where they will do the most good. Making sure
that people can in fact move from one jurisdiction to another is one ex-
ample, since mobility facilitates liberty by making it difficult for one ju-
risdiction to reap the fruits of oppression. Assuring that political
participation is open to all is another low-cost, highly effective means of
assuring that governments will respond to citizens. It is not a coincidence
that these help assure the viability of Albert Hirschman's "exit and
voice" modes of individual response to conflict in political, social, and
economic organizations. 79
My view that the court is only one member of a broad set of protec-
tions for constitutional liberties makes me agree that the 1937 court
revolution that Carolene Products epitomized was correct in abandoning
close review of business regulation.80 Businesses can normally protect
themselves through the political process and by the self-help remedy of
relocation and reallocation.8 1 At the state level, most businesses can
threaten to exit, a threat that might even be credible at the national level
for some firms.8 2 (The term exit includes downsizing and other elastic
supply responses, not just physically leaving the jurisdiction.)
That self-protective activities in the political arena are called by the
pejorative term "rent seeking" by public choice theorists is not persua-
sive.8 3 Unless the critics of rent seeking have in mind a world that lacks
transaction costs as a comparison, the relevant question is whether impo-
sition of judicial review is apt to reduce the sum of error and transaction
costs. My view of the analytical capacity of judges (discussed in a later
78. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (describing cattle fencing and trespass
disputes resolved efficiently without reference to the law).
79. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). Hirschman is actually am-
bivalent about the threat of exit in disciplining bad governments, recognizing that it may impede
redistribution of wealth. Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and the State, 31 WORLD POL. 90 (1978).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
81. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98
Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983), presents an optimistic view of the economic outcomes of pluralistic politics,
in conscious contrast to majority-rule systems.
82. Economists have assembled evidence that taxes and regulations do indeed affect business
location, implying that relocation is not an empty threat. See Robert Newman & Dennis Sullivan,
Econometric Analysis of Business Tax Impacts on Industrial Location: Who Do We Know, and How
Do We Know It?, 23 J. URB. ECON. 215 (1988).
83. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224
(1967), is the seminal work on rent seeking. A tongue-in-cheek review of estimates of its impact by a
sympathizer is William R. Dougan, The Cost of Rent Seeking: Is GNP Negative?, 99 J. POL. ECON.
660 (1991).
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section of this essay) and the inventiveness of lawyers (which needs no
discussion) leads me to doubt it.
What of that parade of economic regulatory horribles that almost
anyone can throw out in retort? My reluctance to advocate aggressive
judicial action to correct them is that in a democracy, people learn
chiefly by experience. Experience is not the only teacher, but it is usually
the most convincing, and it is always more convincing than judicial pro-
nouncements. The effects of farm price supports, wage and price con-
trols, airline regulation, minimum wage laws, and conventional rent
controls cannot be appreciated without some experience with them or at
least observing someone else's experience with them. 84 Critics of regula-
tion have eagerly pointed out the evils of excessive state control as the
veils of socialism have dropped around the world. As a more prosaic
example, the nonsensical special interest legislation upheld in Carolene
Products has long since been vitiated, even before we learned that "filled"
milk is probably more wholesome as well as cheaper than the real
thing.85
The reference to Professor Miller's study of Carolene Products is
ironic because he and many other law and economics scholars have ar-
gued that the real problem with economic legislation is that it responds
to a minority of special interests to the detriment of the majority. 6 This
has led several commentators to advocate closer judicial scrutiny of spe-
cial interest legislation. Bruce Ackerman has written that "[o]ther things
being equal, 'discreteness and insularity' will normally be a source of
enormous bargaining advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in
pluralist American politics. '' aT
84. As an example, Berkeley economist Michael Teitz, who has consulted frequently on rent
control, told me in conversation that Los Angeles rent control advocates cannot convince the city
council to engage in truly stringent rent control. Los Angeles council members look at the rancor of
neighboring Santa Monica, which is one of the few California cities with rigorous rent controls, and
always step back from the abyss. In a similar vein, the San Francisco Examiner editorialized against
an initiative that would have made that city's rent control ordinance more stringent by holding up
nearby Berkeley as a bad example of what would happen under stringent rent control. No on Va-
cancy Control, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 27, 1991, at A16:l. The voters apparently agreed, and the
vacancy control initiative was defeated.
85. Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 397, 419-20.
86. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 495 (2d ed. 1977); Carol Rose,
The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monarch-
ism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74 (1989); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. SC. 3, 3 (1971).
87. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-24 (1985)
(emphasis added). See also Peter Aronson, Calhoun's Constitutional Economics, 2 CONST. POL.
EcON. 31 (1991). Ackerman's thesis is criticized on grounds other than those in the text by Daniel
Farber & Philip Fricky, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dy-
namics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685, 701-08 (1991), and Einer Elhauge, Does
Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
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I italicized the last condition because, regardless of the overall mer-
its of Ackerman's thesis, its premise applies only where there is pluralis-
tic politics, not majoritarian politics. Local governments, particularly the
suburbs and small cities, are not governed by special interest politics.
Robert Ellickson regards suburban growth controls as the product of the
majoritarian factionalism that Madison worried about in the Tenth Fed-
eralist.8 8 Economists' empirical studies of local government spending and
taxing indicate that the median voter (i.e., majority rule) model, not the
special interest (i.e., pluralist) model, works best.8 9
The Hall case is a paradigm of effective majoritarianism. Santa Bar-
bara's mobile home rent control was a regulatory transfer that was more
efficient and more responsive to the will of a majority than most other
regulations adopted at the state level. It is precisely because the local
transfer had so little deadweight loss and because it responded to major-
ity preferences to the detriment of a clearly defined minority, mobile
home park owners, that its unfairness costs are so high. Lack of dead-
weight loss means that no other voters except personal sympathizers with
the mobile home park owners felt any ill effects of the regulation. The
usual majoritarian or, as economists say it, median voter dominance of
local politics makes it clear that any hope of political influence to recoup
some reciprocal gains in the future would be vain. The Halls were victims
of the success of a parochial democracy. 90
When we economists condemn the absurd system of farm subsidies,
88. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE
L.J. 385, 405 (1977). See also FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 209; Note, City Government in the State
Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1597 (1965).
89. See Thomas E. Borcherding & Robert Deacon, The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal
Governments: An Econometric Approach to Collective Choice, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 891 (1972); Ran-
dall G. Holcombe, The Median Voter Model in Public Choice Theory, 61 PuB. CHOICE 115 (1989);
Robert P. Inman, Testing Political Economy's "As If" Proposition: Is the Median Income Voter Re-
ally Decisive?, 33 PUB. CHOICE 45 (1979). I should not leave the impression that this topic is entirely
settled among economists. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, The Elusive Median Voter, 12 J.
PuB. ECON. 143 (1979), question the evidence, but they do not distinguish between large and small
units of government or present empirical evidence. Evidence that the median voter model works best
for small units of government (suburbs and small cities rather than central cities) is in Douglas
Holtz-Eakin & Harvey S. Rosen, The "Rationality" of Municipal Capital Spending: Evidence from
New Jersey, 19 REGIONAL ScI. & URB. ECON. 517 (1989); see also Howard S. Bloom & Helen Ladd,
Property Tax Revaluation and Tax Levy Growth, 11 J. URB. EON. 73 (1982).
90. A similar argument is advanced by Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22
CONN. L. REV. 285, 309 (1990). He argues that logrolling generally assures that benefits and bur-
dens are spread out, so that compensation is required only when "majorities may mistreat minori-
ties." For a similar view, see Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation: An Anti-
Discrimination Theory of Takings, 12 INT'L REV. L. & EON. 125 (1992). The difference in our
views is that Levmore and Farber make no distinction between small local governments and large
state and national governments. They thus regard landlords as effective a political force as tenants so
that no compensation is required. Nor does Levmore identify deadweight loss as a factor in disciplin-
ing excessive regulation.
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for example, we should recall that a true majority rule vote might leave
us, at least temporarily, with farm-price ceilings, whose shortage effects
would be even worse than the present system. Direct democracy 9' at the
state or national level could involve costs similar to the majoritarian ex-
cesses that induced the anxieties that gave rise to the U.S. Constitutional
Convention. It is worth remembering that James Madison sought to
lodge power in a "large republic" to offset the excesses of smaller
governments. 92
It is true that the states under the Articles of Confederation were
what Madison had in mind as small republics. But most states at the time
were not much larger in population than present day medium sized cit-
ies, and several states now exceed the population of the U.S. in 1790. 93
The quintessential small republics of today are the suburbs and small
cities. That special interest, rather than majoritarian, legislation is most
common in the present states and the national government is a tribute to
the success of Madison's design to guard against government by
majoritarian factions, not an indicator of its failure.
E. Mobile Home Rent Control and Politics
Because my analysis hinges on the majoritarian character of local
rather than state government, the reader may ask at this point whether
California's mobile home rent control statutes are purely local govern-
ment phenomena. The answer is no. At the most general level, all local
regulation can be superseded by state regulation. Although rent control
was regarded by the California courts as an inherent property of local
police powers,94 it is clear that the state legislature can overrule its locali-
ties. For example, shortly after the city of Berkeley adopted commercial
rent control, the legislature banned such regulation statewide.95 At a
91. For a critique of judicial deference to initiatives and referenda as the equal of legislative
enactments at the state level, see Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503 (1990). Eule does not treat takings in this context, but I would have courts look more critically
at regulations adopted by initiative than by other means. FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 222-23.
92. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison). Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in Ameri-
can Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 40-45 (1985), points this out, but neglects the issue of local
regulation. Thomas Merrill, in a largely sympathetic review of Epstein's Takings, adverts to the
"large republic" defense of property, but notes in passing that this does not help with most local land
use regulations. Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1561, 1590 (1986).
93. Half the states in 1790 had fewer than 100,000 people. U.S. population was about 4 million
in 1790, about the size of present-day Washington State or Maryland. The two largest states in 1790
were Virginia, 692,000, and Pennsylvania, 434,000.
94. Birkinfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1023 (Cal. 1976).
95. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 824, § 2 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1954.27 (Deering 1992)). A
federal judge had, prior to the legislature's sweeping action, found that Berkeley's statute violated
the Contract Clause and, under an analysis that relied heavily on Hall, possibly also the Takings
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more particular level, it is clear that several strands of the web of mobile
home rent regulation are created by the state legislature. The anti-evic-
tion laws are products of the state legislature, while the decisions to
adopt rent control and permit or deny vacancy decontrol are left to local
governments.
My investigation into the politics of mobile home rent control re-
vealed that there are two opposing lobbying organizations that operate
both at the state and the local level. 96 The Western Mobilehome Associa-
tion (WMA) represents park owners, 97 and the Golden State Mobilhome
Owners League (GSMOL) is an organization of tenant-coach owners.
(Among their differences is the way they spell mobile home.) GSMOL
has been instrumental in adopting the state enabling legislation and local
rent controls, and WMA has combatted GSMOL consistently on these
issues. Given this situation, it seems to be a closer question as to whether
park owners are truly the victims of majoritarian legislation, or whether
they are just the current losers in the pluralistic, logrolling politics that
surely characterizes the legislature of a large state like California. If the
latter characterization is more apt, my normative model would offer a
weaker case for judicial intervention on behalf of park owners.
The tenants' organization, GSMOL, has about 200,000 members,98
while WMA has only about 2000.99 But the theory of public choice tells
us that counting voters does not dispose of the issue, since politicians
respond to monetary support as well as votes. If WMA owners spend
more than the GSMOL to influence legislation (which both sides seem to
concede), they should sometimes prevail even when directly opposed by
GSMOL. The apparent reasons for WMA's failure to do so on the criti-
Clause. Ross v. City of Berkeley, 655 F. Supp. 820, 836-41 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The legal victory by
owners may have taken the wind out of the sails of commercial rent control advocates, so the legisla-
tive victory by landlords cannot be taken as unambiguous evidence that commercial landlords can
protect their assets solely through the political process.
96. My knowledge of the politics of this issue is largely from interviews with Paul Deffebach,
Regional Director for Local Government and Community Relations of the Western Mobilehome
Association (WMA), San Mateo, California, and Gerry McLeish, of the firm of Craig and Biddle,
Sacramento, which represents WMA in Sacramento. I have also perused a year's issues of the
monthly newspaper of the Golden State Mobilhome Owners League, THE CALIFORNIAN, which
gives detailed accounts of GSMOL's legislative activities.
97. A small group of park owners is represented by the Mobile Home Park Owners Alliance,
which apparently split from WMA, but which largely works in concert with it.
98. Brief of Golden State Mobilhome Owners League, Inc., National Foundation of Manufac-
tured Homeowners, and Designated Mobilhome Owners Associations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 1, Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (No. 90-1947). The pro-tenant
policies are presumably favored by many mobile home park tenants who do not belong the GSMOL.
99. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Western Mobilehome Association in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (No. 90-1947).
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cal issue of rent control, however, are instructive. 100
Mobile home parks are not randomly distributed across the state.
Some places have a large number of them, and tenants constitute a large
voting block in such districts. One such district is Escondido, represented
in the state senate by Bill Craven. Mr. Craven is a Republican whose
voting record receives large approval ratings by the state chamber of
commerce and developer organizations. Mr. Craven has been, however,
the author of numerous mobile home tenant protection bills. The reason
is simple: there are more than 10,000 mobile home coaches in his district,
and their owners make it clear to him, through GSMOL, how they think
he should vote.
That GSMOL even exists seems unusual; the free-rider problem of
tenants' organizations would seem to work against it. But mobile home
coach owners are easier to organize than other tenants. Unlike most
apartment tenants, they have a long-run financial stake in legislation,
since they own their coaches. Mobile home owners are also a more ho-
mogenous group; most are white retired people who are conservative on
most issues.10 They live in close-knit neighborhoods and meet in park
community activities, and they have plenty of time to devote to politics.
One might think that the park owners, the WMA, would have some
allies in other industry groups, such as apartment owners, realtors, devel-
opers, and mobile home manufacturers, to combat GSMOL on an issue
as important as rent control at the state level. While there is a loose alli-
ance in Sacramento called the "shelter group," mobile home park owners
are easily carved out of it. When the shelter group sought (unsuccess-
fully) statewide legislation eliminating all forms of rent control, mobile
homes were quickly eliminated as an exception to the proposed rule. The
reason was that GSMOL quickly objected and it became apparent that
the legislation could not move forward unless an exception were made
for mobile homes, permitting localities to adopt rent control as before.
Because of the distinctiveness of the market, the usual line-drawing dis-
tinctions that would arise, say, between owners of small apartment
houses and large units did not arise. It became easy for other members of
100. That GSMOL almost always wins against the WMA on rent control and tenant-rights
issues is proclaimed by GSMOL in its newspaper. WMA Must Really be Worried, THE CALIFOR-
NIAN (Golden State Mobilhome Owners League, Inc., Garden Grove, Cal.), Apr. 1991, at 4. This
was confirmed orally to me in separate interviews with Paul Deffebach and Gerry McLeish, who, as
paid lobbyists for WMA, have little incentive to understate the political success of the organization.
101. I cannot help observing that the frequent claim that these retired people live on a "fixed
income" cannot be true in the usual sense of fixed income, which refers to nominal incomes. Social
Security undoubtedly forms most of their retirement income, and Social Security has for years been
indexed to keep up with inflation.
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the forces opposed to rent control to set the mobile home park owners
adrift.
Realtors, apartment house owners, and developers of other housing
often have interests contrary to that of park owners. For realtors, the
relative efficiency of the regulatory transfer makes some of them favora-
bly disposed towards mobile home rent control. A realtor's commission
on selling a coach is enhanced if the sale price also includes the dis-
counted value of rent control. Developers and owners of conventional
apartments are perhaps more wary of the naked transfer effected by mo-
bile home rent control, but, after all, mobile home parks are low-cost
competitors for their products, and they may secretly be pleased to see
park expansion stymied. None of the briefs for the park owners in the
Yee appeal to the United States Supreme Court was joined by apartment
owners, developers, or realtors. The tenants' organization, GSMOL, ap-
pears to have isolated its opponent at the state level in much the same
way that it succeeds at the local level.102
GSMOL's success is not just the result of clever politics; it is as
much the result of the nature of the mobile home park market. The sub-
jection of park owners to majoritarian preferences at the local level is the
result of their political isolation at the state level. This isolation would
not amount to much if the park owners could vote with their feet or
otherwise withdraw from the market, but the transfer of land rent ef-
fected by the web of regulations prevents that as well. Hence the theory
of regulatory takings advanced in this article, which limits judicial inter-
vention to instances in which the political and economic markets offer no
hope of respite, supports the Hall decision and Judge Kozinski's paradox
of efficiency.
The immobility of land also makes me skeptical of Vicki Been's
otherwise convincing articulation of the "exit/voice" model for not su-
pervising local land use exactions. 0 3 She correctly notes that developers
can choose among jurisdictions, so that if one community imposes exac-
tions that unreasonably increase developers' costs, they will head for
other places. In support of Professor Been's approach, I note that it is not
a coincidence that local governments seldom attempt to regulate the
price of groceries, an issue surely as important to their constituents as
housing prices. Even if grocers are caught entirely by surprise by such a
regulation, the immediate threat will be to suspend business in the juris-
102. WMA Amicus Brief at 8, Yee (No. 90-1947), indicates that of the 87 local jurisdictions that
have mobile home rent control, only 13 also apply rent control to apartments.
103. Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991).
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diction. Even under "moderate" price regulation, the quality of service is
likely to decline. Because local voters will bear at least some of these
costs, they are likely to urge errant city council members to rescind or
modify the regulations.
The problem with Been's theory for land use exactions is that the
landowner is the person who is bearing the costs, and landowners cannot
move their assets. It is easy to suppose that it is the itinerant developer
who bears the costs because in most situations the developer has to take
an equity position in land in order to get his plans going. But the devel-
oper's willingness to pay for the land depends on anticipated regulatory
burdens, so that the effect of regulations or anticipated exactions re-
dounds upon the party who owns the land when the regulatory scheme is
adopted. ° 4 "Exit" has a hollow meaning for people with immovable
assets.
F. The Elusive Physical Invasion/Regulation Distinction
So far this article has argued that Judge Kozinski's paradox-that
the inefficiency of regular rent control saves it from being a taking--can
be expanded to a general rule for identifying regulatory transfers whose
unfairness only judges can cure. The prospect of deadweight loss of an
inefficient regulatory transfer means that there are people harmed by it
who will politically attempt to modify it. The special interest legislation
that emerges from pluralistic politics, whose results are often condemned
as inefficient, enables potential victims of regulatory burdens to protect
themselves politically by coalitions and vote trading. When neither of
these conditions is present, as in California mobile home rent control
laws, judges acting under the takings clause are the only bulwark against
unfair regulatory takings of property.
As was noted, however, Judge Kozinski did not base his legal deci-
sion on this idea. He instead stretched the physical invasion standard
from Loretto to include the dispossession of the landlord's interest in
Hall. The reason for his doing so is that under California law, a regula-
tory taking requires showing a much greater burden than that borne by
mobile home park owners. There was no evidence that their property had
been devalued more than the typical land use control would devalue
other forms of property.
104. Several economic studies indicate that land use regulations are capitalized in the price of
raw land, so that the original land owner, not the subsequent buyer, bears the burden. For a review
of the evidence, see FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 21-27 . See also Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among
Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831, 867 (1992) (agreeing
that landowners are vulnerable to exactions).
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My purpose in this section is to show that Kozinski's clever legal
maneuver illustrates the vacuousness of the physical invasion/regulation
distinction. This is not a criticism of Judge Kozinski. I think he is correct
in his conclusion that local mobile home rent controls (at least those with
vacancy controls), coupled with state and local tenant-rights legislation,
does effect a transfer of a possessory interest. Moreover, I think that this
analogy was the best that an intermediate-level appellate court judge
could do given the precedents. By showing the impossibility of maintain-
ing a neat distinction between regulation and physical invasion, Kozin-
ski's maneuver points to the necessity of a better way to judge regulatory
takings. It is Kozinski's paradox that points to that better way.
Stretching the boundaries of the physical invasion standard to in-
clude what in common language would be called regulatory burdens can
be criticized as defeating one aspect of Michelman's half-hearted defense
of the physical invasion/regulation distinction. 0 5 The advantage of the
distinction is that it lowers transaction costs; it is a "bright line rule" that
is easily understood and that might keep down settlement costs. Econo-
mists might further defend it or any other easily ascertained rule as pro-
viding a pole around which parties can bargain successfully.' 0 6 Even
though bargaining is costly, it is presumably easier to do so if there is no
ambiguity in the initial entitlement.
The merit of the bright-line argument hinges on physical invasion
being easily separated from regulation. If regulation shades imperceptibly
into invasion, as Judge Kozinski pointed out in Hall, even the slight
merit of a bright-line distinction evaporates. I will explore instances of
blurriness other than that indirectly indicated by Judge Kozinski.
One instance arises when government wishes to acquire property,
that is, physically occupy it, that is heavily regulated. What should the
government pay for it? If advocates of the invasion/regulation distinction
were truly committed to the rule, they would not inquire at all into the
motives of a government that, just before condemnation proceedings had
begun, had adopted a highly restrictive zoning classification on the prop-
erty to be condemned. If this were permitted, the physical invasion stan-
dard would in fact be moot. While the owner would receive "just
compensation" for that which she lost by the physical invasion, what she
lost would be trivial if the regulation were unimpeachable.
No state court in fact would countenance the previous scenario.
105. Michelman, supra note 17, at 1227-29.
106. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1697, 1702-07 (1988).
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Even the California courts, which seem dedicated to preserving the inva-
sion/regulation distinction, will inquire into motives if a recently adopted
regulation has an opportunistic air about it. 107 1 take this as evidence that
the invasion/regulation line is not all that bright.
To further show the invasion/regulation line's blurriness, let me of-
fer a puzzle that I read about in the New York Times. 10 8 The City of
New York sought to condemn some rent controlled buildings in order to
expand Brooklyn Borough Hall. There was no hint that rent control and
the project had anything to do with one another. The question was
whether the tenants should be compensated for the loss of rent controlled
apartments, not just for the usual moving costs that eminent domain im-
plementation statutes often require.
Let's suppose that the tenants were not compensated. The market
value of the building was probably substantially less under rent control
than otherwise. In making plans for city projects, I presume that city
planners have at least a rough idea of what buildings will cost to con-
demn. At some margin of decision, it could appear more rational to un-
dertake a condemnation of a rent controlled building than one that was
not. Hence in this situation, rent control leads to a physical invasion that
would not otherwise have occurred, even though the government has not
acted opportunistically in any way.
The cure for the excess condemnation in this instance would be to
pay tenants for their putative estate. As I mentioned earlier in discussing
rent control and expectations, tenants in New York City, which has had
rent control for over fifty years, may well have acquired an entitlement
for which they should be compensated. But a court considering condem-
nation awards for apartment buildings in cities that have more youthful,
less settled rent control policies should not assign much weight to such
arguments, especially since landlords could argue that the rent controls
were only temporary measures in response to an unusual situation, a ra-
tionale historically used in defense of rent controls. The main point here
is that there are plausible margins at which regulation induces physical
invasion even when the condemnor is not behaving opportunistically.
107. See Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391, 403 (Ct. App. 1969) (downzoning
land for airport acquisition held a taking). But see People v. Talleur, 145 Cal. Rptr. 150, 154 (Ct.
App. 1978) (indicating that coastal land acquired by eminent domain should reflect the market de-
valuation by the regulations of the California Coastal Commission). These may be distinguishable on
the grounds that the Coastal Commission was created by statewide, not local, initiative, and the act
was not obviously aimed at any particular owner's property. But adoption by initiative does raise
additional political process questions. See Eule, supra note 91.
108. Nadine Brozan, Brooklynites Balk at Relocation Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1989, § 1, at
(Vol. 67:865
EXPLORING THE KOZINSKI PARADOX
My last example is more speculative. I suspect that the physical in-
vasion of the cable TV box that was held a compensable taking in Loretto
was in part occasioned by attempts to rationalize rent control regulation.
Jurisdictions that adopt rent control typically find that they must keep
the landlord from collecting on the side what he cannot collect up front.
One of the latter devices is "key money" or "finder's fees," in which new
tenants pay someone to get access to a rent controlled apartment. °0 Key
money does not necessarily find its way to the landlord's pocket. The
outgoing tenant, the neighbors, or building superintendents may get
some or all of it.
An alternative to key money that would work more in the landlord's
interest would be to charge above-market prices for some service con-
nected with the building. Hence it might be in the landlord's interest to
charge tenants for access to cable TV, electricity, or water, knowing that
the tenant will be willing to pay some extra amount rather than move to
another building. This scheme has the advantage to landlords and disad-
vantage to tenants of collecting payments from current as well as pro-
spective tenants. Since most buildings caught in rent control already have
electricity and water, the landlord could not impose charges for installing
them. Cable TV, which arrived after most rent-controlled buildings were
built, might offer a lever to recoup for the landlord some of the gap be-
tween rent control and market rent.
In order to foil this avenue for collecting side payments, the govern-
ment would want to regulate the terms by which access to cable TV was
permitted. Such a regulation was what gave rise to the Loretto case. The
trivial physical invasion by the cable TV company that was held to be a
taking was a necessary concomitant of the regulation, which was in turn,
if my speculation is correct, logically compelled by rent regulation.
The New York Court of Appeals provided some evidence in support
of my theory of the origins of the cable TV regulation. (The New York
court had ruled that no taking had occurred.) Its opinion quoted from a
New York State Public Service Commission (PSC) report: "In the elec-
tronic age, the landlord should not be able to preclude a tenant from
obtaining CATV service (or to exact a surcharge for allowing the service)
any more than he could preclude a tenant from receiving mail or tele-
grams directed to him." The opinion then quoted from the PSC Chair-
man's testimony, which concluded that "Legislation is necessary,
109. For a rueful personal story about how key money works in New York City apartments, see
Epstein, supra note 65, at 741.
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however, to prohibit gouging and arbitrary action. "110
I do not want to oversell this proposition. Cable TV access legisla-
tion might well be warranted even without rent control. There may be
network externalities to having universal access to cable TV. But it is
interesting that the case itself arose in New York City, which has some of
the most intractable rent controls in the country. Most landlords in cities
without rent control would not feel burdened by the cable TV access
regulation, since it simply compelled them to accept something that was
in their own financial interest to have. In a free market for apartments,
only idiosyncratic or short-sighted owners would want to withhold a ser-
vice that made the rent and value of their apartment houses higher. I
hope that I have at least planted a germ of doubt as to the viability of a
neat separation of regulation from physical invasion from the case in
which the distinction seems so important.
Attacks on the physical invasion/regulation distinction run the risk
of being too persuasive. Michael Berger pointed out that a recent Califor-
nia rent control opinion cited arguments against the distinction in sup-
port of not paying compensation even for physical invasions.", It is
rather like the story of the fascist general who, persuaded by onlookers
that his original revenge on a rebellious village of shooting every tenth
man was unfair, proceeded to shoot them all. The question remains, why
compensate for physical invasions?
The answer would, of course, require another article at the least.
One obvious beginning is that the demoralization costs of not paying are
so high and settlement costs of paying are so low in the physical invasion
cases. The small insight that I would add is that compensation for physi-
cal takings is a nearly universal policy among the nations of the world." 12
I find it interesting that compensation for regulatory takings is almost as
universally absent among the rest of the world.' t 3 The U.S. is nearly
alone in this regard, but we are almost as nearly alone with regard to the
extent to which we rely on local governments to autonomously decide on
regulations.'1 4 The highly regulated cities of Europe take their orders
110. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 328 (N.Y. 1981), rev'd,
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
111. Michael M. Berger, 6th District Flip-Flops on Vacancy Decontrol, L.A. DAILY J., May 31,
1991 (describing Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, 280 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1991)).
112. COMPENSATION FOR COMPULSORY PURCHASE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (J.F. Garner ed.
1975).
113. Anthony Ogus, Property Rights and Freedom of Economic Activity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louise Henkin &
Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
114. An interesting exception is Switzerland, which also has strong local governments and does
recognize the concept of regulatory takings. Its courts have had no more success than those of the
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from national parliaments, in which pluralistic politics is the rule. This is
not to say that some regulatory takings doctrines might not be a good
idea for other countries. It is only to suggest that the politics of regula-
tion is often different in the United States, and that may offer another
reason for paying special attention in regulatory takings to that uniquely
American phenomenon, independent local government.
G. Judging and Economic Reasoning
This section illustrates by example the hazards of relying on judges
to apply economic principles. Its purpose is to combat the hopeful idea
that if only the judges would pay attention to economic principles, the
takings issue could be settled. The text for my claim is Judge Howard
Wiener's opinion in Yee v. City of Escondido, a California appellate case
that specifically rejected the reasoning in Hall and went to the trouble of
explaining why.1 15
Judge Wiener in Yee asserts that mobile home parks are a "quasi-
monopoly" without ever defining the term, let alone providing any evi-
dence for the allegation. Nonetheless, he is right in suggesting that there
are probably barriers to entry for someone who wants to set up a mobile
home park in a given community. Entry into the mobile home business is
not free because at one time many local land use controls sought to ban
them altogether.116 For the government that creates a shortage of mobile
home parks to turn around and accuse those who overcame the regula-
tory hurdles of charging unfairly high rents seems bizarrely unfair. If any
remedy were due for monopoly, it should be against the local govern-
ment that hindered the development.
In any event, though, looking at mobile home parks within a single
community as a monopoly overlooks the numerous substitutes for hous-
ing, including mobile home sites outside of parks, apartments, other
homes, and similar accommodations in nearby communities. Even with
the local government hostility to mobile home parks, they are remarka-
bly numerous in California. By no stretch of the imagination of the most
eager antitrust economist could mobile home parks in California be re-
garded as having monopoly power. 17
U.S. in resolving when a regulation becomes a taking, however. Enrico Riva, Regulatory Takings in
American Law and "Material Expropriation" in Swiss Law. A Comparison of the Applicable Stan-
dards, 16 URB. L. 425, 425, 429-34 (1984).
115. Yee v. City of Escondido, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct 1522 (1991).
116. This was prior to 1981 legislation that required local governments to reduce barriers to
mobile home placement. Compliance with this law seems widespread. PLANNERS SURVEY, supra
note 33, at 1.
117. In 1984 there were 5812 mobile home parks in California, containing 432,066 spaces.
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The more novel sophistry in Yee is Judge Wiener's attempt to use
elementary economic theory to justify the transfer of value from park
owner to coach owner, which he concedes has occurred. He asserts that
mobile home pads and the coaches that sit upon them are complements;
you can't have a mobile home without a place to park it. 118When the
price of an item declines, economists teach that the price of goods com-
plementary to the item are apt to rise, unless they are in perfectly elastic
supply. Judge Wiener uses the pithy example of popcorn: its price goes
down, the price of popcorn poppers will rise. Hence, Judge Wiener im-
plies, the capitalization of the rent control into the price of coaches is the
free market at work, not some conspiracy to dispossess the owner. Take
that, you law-and-economics judges, is the subtext.
The fallacies of his argument are at least three, one of which Judge
Wiener soon owns up to. The one he admits is that if the rise in coach
values were just the law of demand for complementary goods, one would
see the value of all coaches rise. ' 19. This did not happen; only the coaches
that were actually in place in mobile home parks that were subject to rent
control rose in value. Having admitted this rather special application,
Judge Wiener goes on to claim that it is acceptable for only some to
benefit. This manifestation of a naked transfer is exactly what Judge
Kozinski finds so offensive, but Judge Wiener, having arrived at it as a
special case of natural economic response to regulation, finds it no more
bothersome than the typical regulation.
The second problem with Judge Wiener's complementary goods
model is that the normal, though often implicit, assumption embedded in
the economic analysis of complementary goods is that the price reduction
in popcorn, for instance, is the result of popcorn having become more
plentiful. That is, there has been an outward shift in supply (e.g., an un-
expectedly large corn crop), which reduces prices and induces consumers
to buy more corn, which in turn shifts out the demand for popcorn pop-
pers. The pedagogical reason for leaving the supply-shift assumption un-
stated is, in my experience, that teachers do not want to confuse
OWNER SURVEY, supra note 31, at 4. The survey indicated that 92 percent of all spaces are located
in parks with fewer than 400 spaces, and that the largest one percent of parks in the sample ac-
counted for no more than 8 percent of all spaces. Id. at 14. It is possible that Judge Wiener's refer-
ence to monopoly refers to the bilateral bargaining situation that arises when there is a surplus that
can be divided between two parties. In this situation, each party has a "monopoly" in the sense of
having a strategic holdout position vis-a-vis the other. See generally Robert Cooter, The Cost of
Coase, 11 J. LEG. STUD. I (1982).
118. Yee, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
119. "The complementary good effect will be substantially limited to those mobilehomes cur-
rently occupying rent-controlled spaces." Id.
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beginning students with supply considerations while talking about de-
mand theory. Maybe we should risk some confusion.
If popcorn were reduced in price by a price control but no more
corn were available, so that cheap corn was rationed and black markets
suppressed, it is hard to imagine why holders of the "cheap" corn would
want more poppers than they had before. The analogy of ordinary com-
plementary goods markets to the mobile home rent control cases is inap-
propriate because what reduced the price of pads was not an increase in
the supply of pads. Exactly the opposite was true, most probably because
of the regulatory climate. 120
The third economic fallacy in Yee is that pads and coaches are nec-
essarily complements. In an open market, the economic theory of cities
teaches that land and capital (buildings) are substitutes.12' The reason
houses in the suburbs are one or two stories is because land is cheaper
than in the big city, where high land prices induce developers to put large
amounts of capital on small lots. Suburban builders and consumers, on
the other hand, substitute relatively cheap land for capital.
The alleged complementarity of land and capital in mobile home
parks is only because park owners decided on a particular configuration
in the past, not anticipating the adoption of rent controls. It is the adop-
tion of the controls themselves, which with their usual tenant rights pro-
visions retard any reconfiguration, that made for the apparent
complementarity of the pads and the coaches. Shoes and bananas are not
complementary goods (except in Buster Keaton movies), but if the gov-
ernment ruled that shoe sellers had to sell a banana to every customer,
the market for shoes and bananas would look as if they were
complements.
Another economic argument, though it does not seem that Judge
Wiener was aware that economists have used it, is also advanced in Yee.
He says that mobile home parks voluntarily got into the business and
thus implicitly accepted the risk of regulation. 122 This invokes a notice or
rational expectations argument. It strikes me as being as disingenuous as
the judge's assertion that mobile home owners are free to exit the busi-
ness, when just-cause eviction laws could delay such a shutdown indefi-
nitely. Does anyone really believe that the park owners would have gone
into the business in the past had they anticipated the regulations that
were adopted?
120. See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 22, at 463.
121. EDWIN MILLS & BRUCE HAMILTON, URBAN ECONOMICS 97 (4th ed. 1989).
122. Yee, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
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The notice argument might be applicable, though I would reserve
judgment on it, to steely-eyed owners who established parks after the first
rent controls were adopted. (It would not apply to someone who bought
a pre-existing mobile home park, since what the purchaser bought in-
cluded all of the legal rights that the previous owner had, which included
any right to just compensation for a taking or other legal remedy. 123) For
a judge to dismiss a complaint by saying, in effect, you should have seen
it coming, is to avoid being a judge. An economist or a business advisor
might use the rational expectations argument to explain in a positive way
what will happen as a result of political decisions and in anticipation of a
judge's decision, but what constitutes a reasonable expectation in the
present context is for a judge to decide.
H. Entitlement Chopping and Regulation Chopping
The practice of dividing takings into physical invasions and regula-
tions has been criticized as an unproductive formalism. 124 This section
identifies another kind of formalism that is not widely recognized, but
which the California Yee opinion epitomizes. I dub the new formalism
"regulation chopping."
"Regulation chopping" is analogous to "entitlement chopping," a
term coined by Frank Michelman to disparage one approach to the tak-
ings issue. 125 Entitlement chopping would almost always yield a decision
that a regulation is a taking. A judge on an entitlement chopping spree
would divide the bundle of property rights into their component sticks
and see if one of the sticks were gone entirely as a result of the regulation.
It is alleged by Judge Wiener in Yee that Justice Holmes did exactly that
in Pennsylvania Coal when he held that the Pennsylvania ordinance that
required that coal be mined underground without causing subsidence
was an unconstitutional taking of the contractually reserved right to be
free of liability for surface subsidence. 126
My reading of that difficult case does not hinge on regarding
Holmes as a protector of specific types of property rights, in part because
in other instances he had no trouble with burdensome regulations that
123. The reasons are explained in Fischel & Shapiro, Takings, supra note 12, at 287.
124. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1625 (1988).
125. Id. at 1601. Michelman quickly reverts to Margaret Radin's term, "conceptual severance,"
to describe the idea that each stick from the bundle of property rights should be examined and
protected separately. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988).
126. Judge Wiener attributes this characterization of Pennsylvania Coal to Karl Manheim, Ten-
ant Eviction and the Takings Clause, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 925, 968. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 274
Cal. Rptr. 551, 555 n.7 (Ct. App. 1990).
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would clearly have run afoul of an entitlement chopping analysis. 127 But
I agree that entitlement chopping is an unsatisfactory way of resolving
takings. A creative conveyancer could chop out almost any right to prop-
erty that might then be subject to complete abrogation by even the most
reasonable regulation. For example, an owner anticipating a suburban
housing height limitation of forty feet might convey to another the air
rights above the limit, whose property would be rendered valueless and
thus compensable by the subsequent regulation.
The inverse of entitlement chopping is what I call regulation chop-
ping. This approach to the police power takes each government regula-
tion by itself and sees if it, on its own merits and by itself, would amount
to a taking. Since none is likely to do so, the sum of the government
regulations must not amount to a taking, according to this approach.
This is the approach of Yee and its brethren. Regular rent control is con-
stitutional. Eviction control laws are constitutional. Hence the sum of
these two (and others necessary to effect the wealth transfer) are consti-
tutional. In this way, courts can avoid looking at the stark, demoralizing
transfer that the combination effected.128
My interpretation of Hall is that it attempts to confront the basic
fairness issue in a context that has been thoroughly muddled by the
Supreme Court's attempt to formalize takings law. Hall is as much a
balancing decision as is permitted in the current Constitutional climate
about takings. It is hung on the convenient though slippery hook of
Loretto, but it at least adverts to the meager dialog that Loretto raised
about the essential aspects of property.
It is Yee and its ubiquitous cohorts, which reflexively pigeonhole the
case as nonreviewable economic regulation, that are the modem exam-
ples of formalism. Judge Kozinski's opinion is actually more faithful to a
fairness test, or at least as faithful as an intermediate-level appellate judge
can be in a judicial world rife with per se rules.
127. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (upholding a rent control law that prevented the
owner from repossessing his own apartment without the owner's giving 30 days notice). A scholar
who has reexamined Pennsylvania Coal does not indicate that Holmes's opinion rested on anything
like entitlement chopping. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984). To my mind, the key words of Holmes's opinion are these:
"In general it is not plain that a man's misfortunes or necessities will justify his shifting the damages
to his neighbor's shoulders .... [T]he question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes
desired should fall." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
128. Scholars are not immune from the same sophistry. See, e.g., Karl Manheim, supra note 126,
at 968, who examines tenant protection laws in isolation from rent control with vacancy controls and
concludes for that reason that Hall was wrongly decided.
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. The Kozinski Paradox After the Supreme Court's Yee Decision
The basic content of the previous nine sections was composed prior
to the United States Supreme Court's decision affirming, more or less,
Yee v. City of Escondido.'29 The Court's Yee decision explicitly rejected
what I referred to as the Kozinski maneuver, which shoehorned the mo-
bile home rent control cases into the physical invasion category ex-
pressed by Loretto. The United States Supreme Court's decision does not
change my analysis of the Kozinski paradox even though it does change
the precedental value of Hall v. City of Santa Barbara.
The United States Supreme Court decision did not, however, en-
dorse the California Yee decision that no regulatory taking had occurred.
The Court instead held that the plaintiffs in Yee had relied wrongly on
the reasoning of Hall, and, for that reason, the regulatory takings issue
was not sufficiently briefed for them. Justice O'Connor's opinion in effect
remanded the mobile home rent control controversy to the lower courts
for argument strictly on the regulatory takings doctrine, no physical in-
vasion references allowed.
It is rare for a decision to make everyone a loser, but the Court's Yee
decision seems to have done that. The mobile home park owners lost
their best attempt to get out from under rent control. But the tenant
coach owners did not get rent control affirmed as not being a taking,
either, and they must wait for another round of litigation before they
know to what extent their regulatory rights are secure. Judge Wiener's
complementary goods analysis was ignored, and Judge Kozinski's physi-
cal invasion analogy was rejected.
I have it on the oral authority of Henry Manne, whose program
educates federal judges about economics, that judges really hate to be
reversed. Although I doubt it is much comfort to Judge Kozinski, I
think the Kozinski maneuver was in an important sense a success. The
Supreme Court had in the 1980s seemingly embarked on an attempt to
erect a formalistic set of criteria by which even the most obtuse judge
could identify when a taking had occurred. 130 First and foremost was the
regulation that effected a permanent physical invasion.
One way-maybe the only way-to talk unelected judges out of bad
ideas is to show them the consequences of applying them. Judge Kozin-
ski showed in Hall v. City of Santa Barbara that a rent control ordinance,
coupled with a background of tenant protections and continuing vacancy
controls, could have all of the characteristics of a physical invasion by a
129. Yee v. City of Escondido, 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 1 12 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
130. See Michelman, supra note 124, at 1622.
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third party. Under the web of regulations examined in that case, the park
owner had virtually no prospect of recovering the right to occupy his
own land by the tenant of his choice or even by himself.' 3, But calling
rent control a physical invasion obviously stretches the plain meaning of
the language. What Hall showed was the difficulty, perhaps even the im-
possibility, of constructing a formalistic set of rules to define what consti-
tutes a taking and still remain faithful to the concerns underlying the
Takings Clause.
Justice O'Connor's distinction between an invasion by strangers and
occupancy by tenants whom the land owner had invited prior to the
adoption of rent control is unconvincing. 3 2 Within my experience as a
hiker, I know that many owners of land had voluntarily permitted the
Appalachian Trail to cross their land. Did that acquiescence mean that
no taking had occurred when the U.S. subsequently established perma-
nent hiking easements for the Trail? Aside from the illogic of such an
argument, there would be an enormous unfairness in penalizing land-
owners for having been generous with their land in the past, much as
those mobile home park owners who had charitably (or recklessly, as it
turned out) left rents low were disproportionately penalized when rent
controls were adopted. The same might be said of owners of property
whose developers hired good architects and built nice buildings, only to
find that they were rewarded some years later with uncompensated re-
strictions on demolition from historic preservation ordinances, while
owners of schlock had no such difficulties.
If the United States Supreme Court learned anything from Yee
about the perils of formalism, it did not show in the more recent takings
case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.133 A coastal regulation
adopted in 1988, two years after Mr. Lucas had bought two appropri-
ately zoned building lots for almost one million dollars, forbad any per-
manent dwellings. The state trial court held, incredibly, that the lots had
been rendered "valueless" and, for that reason, a taking had occurred. 34
The South Carolina Supreme Court, accepting the trial court's facts, held
nonetheless that such a devaluation was not a taking because of the
131. Justice O'Connor noted that California law allows the park owner to remove the tenant
after several months' notice, but she does not deal with the numerous roadblocks that local govern-
ments can throw in the way of an owner who seeks to evict a tenant even to leave the business. Yee,
112 S. Ct. at 1528. For examples of such ordinances, see Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d
1270, 1276 n.16 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing local ordinance creating indefinite lease), and, generally,
CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF Hous. & COMMUNITY DEV., supra note 25.
132. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1528.
133. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
134. Id. at 2889.
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harm-prevention language of the Coastal Zone statute. 35 Harm-preven-
tion invokes the so-called "nuisance exception" that the Court has often
invoked in upholding land use regulations.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, creating a new formal
exception to the nuisance exception. What might be called the "value-
less" corollary holds that a regulation disallowing all economic use is
always compensable, even if it is justified in harm-prevention language,
unless the harm to be prevented is discernible in historical understand-
ings of property, such as those embodied in the common law. 136 Legisla-
tive declarations that an activity is a nuisance are not, without more,
presumed to remove the regulation from the reach of the takings clause
in instances in which no economic value remains.
The admirable part of Lucas is its recognition that legislatures
might, if the nuisance exception were absolute, salt all regulatory bills
with antinuisance language to keep them clear of the takings issue. In-
deed, any categorical rule that deferred to legislative pronouncements in-
vites legislatures to evade the demands of the Fifth Amendment or any
other Constitutional command. Courts that suspect regulatory takings
must engage in independent inquiry into provenance of legislative action.
But, for the most part, Lucas misses the fairness issue. Not that fair-
ness is easy in this case. On the one hand, owners of coastal land and
their allies are probably well represented in the South Carolina legisla-
ture. One might even speculate that the delay between South Carolina's
first foray into coastal protection in 1977 and the stringent regulation
adopted in 1988 was due to the influence of such interests. 137 In any case,
there would seem to be little process-theory justification for judicial inter-
vention. This is unlike the situation of having the same legislation emerge
from a local government, where owners of previously developed lots
might easily gang up on owners of undeveloped lots to create a viewscape
without having to pay for it.
On the other hand, the fairness infirmity of the state legislation chal-
lenged in Lucas is the disproportionate impact on an owner in a subdivi-
sion in which all neighboring lots had already been developed and were
thus grandfathered by the legislation. The cost of granting Mr. Lucas an
exception or of paying him for his land seems small compared to the
135. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992).
136. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
137. Beachfront landowners recently exhibited substantial political strength in resisting legisla-
tion that would limit federal flood insurance protection in flood-prone areas. Cornelia Dean, Beach-
front Owners Face Possible Insurance Cuts, N.Y. TIMEs, May 27, 1992, at Al. However, this group
mainly represented the more numerous owners of developed lots, not people in Mr. Lucas' position.
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alleged benefits of the bill. Indeed, as the record indicates, the South Car-
olina legislature took the former remedy by amending their law to permit
discretionary exceptions for owners caught in Mr. Lucas's situation.
The legislature acted after the state trial court's takings decision but
before the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision. One cannot know if
the legislature would have acted to provide an avenue of redress for Lu-
cas and others in the absence of the trial court's takings decision, but that
fact did not require the United States Supreme Court to fall back on
formalistic rules to justify reexamination of the case. The wrong to be
righted in Lucas is the apparent disproportionate burden on a single
owner. It is no less a wrong if a trial court finds that the land has some
residual economic value as a tent site 138 than if no such value can be
found.
II. CONCLUSION
The regulatory takings issue is primarily about fairness, not effi-
ciency. Efficiency can nonetheless be used as a guide to detecting in-
stances of unfairness. Judge Kozinski's passing note that the greater
efficiency of regulation of mobile home parks makes them stronger candi-
dates for takings was expanded in this article to show that it embodies
more general principles of where to look for regulatory takings. The pri-
mary candidates are regulation of immovable assets (or assets made im-
movable by regulation) by majoritarian units of government.
The adoption of or changes in such regulations, such as local zoning
and rent controls, does not mean they are unreasonable. Balancing fac-
tors such as reciprocity, disproportionate impact, and the harm-preven-
tion test are appropriate in such instances. My primary novelty is to
suggest that courts can save some of their scarce political capital by ig-
noring all but the most extreme regulations enacted by larger units of
governments, such as the United States Congress, most states, and some
large cities and counties. In these places, economic and political science
research provides reason to believe that pluralistic politics will give those
138. Tenting seems popular with judges. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church was the
remand of the famous Supreme Court case that told the California Courts that monetary damages.
not injunctions, are the required remedy for regulatory takings. First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. Apo. 1989), remanded from 482 U.S. 304
(1987). The California appellate judge found that the county's ban on rebuilding the camp buildings
destroyed by a flood was not a taking largely because the ban paternalistically removed campers
from the risk of flooding. 258 Cal. Rptr. at 902. But when examining whether any economic value
remained to the property after its inclusion in a flood plain zone, Judge Johnson noted that the area
could be used for tents, id., in which campers might be even more exposed to the risk of flooding
than in restored buildings. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Lucas, also mentions tenting as some-
thing Mr. Lucas can do on his beachfront property. 112 S. Ct. at 2908.
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subject to regulation a realistic opportunity to politically protect them-
selves. And the pluralistic democratic political process is, in the long run,
the more secure protection of property.
